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Despite record-level economic inequalities and a vast growth in 
market exploitation, courts remain surprisingly reluctant to exercise 
their power to invalidate the resulting predatory contracts. There is no 
doubt that courts are authorized to invalidate predatory contracts 
based on their unconscionability. There is, however, an ongoing debate 
regarding the desirability of utilizing this judicial power in a capitalist 
society. This Article enters the discussion from a unique angle: it focuses 
less on the bottom line of jurisprudence and more on the law’s expressive 
power—the fact that the law’s impact extends beyond its ability to 
sanction or reward behaviors. Specifically, the Article argues that the 
way in which courts frame and discuss both market misbehaviors and 
the harms they cause may have an immense impact on other peoples’ 
behaviors, a potential that is currently unrecognized. Judicial reviews 
that reach the public domain have the power to encourage or discourage 
future wrongful behaviors and, more broadly, to influence the social 
and ethical norms governing the market. 
This Article begins with a fundamental premise that receives far too 
little consideration in traditional, economic, and even behavioral legal 
analyses: that emotions play a leading role in shaping moral judgments 
and altering actions. Considering the impact of law in the domain of 
the emotions is key to understanding how unconscionability-based 
messages may curb exploitative behavior by fostering self-restraint. 
Drawing on studies in psychology and the neurosciences, the Article first 
explains how the operation of human conscience depends on two 
emotions—guilt and empathy. Next, it juxtaposes the discourse of two 
recent cases, both involving wrongful market behaviors, to demonstrate 
courts’ ability to either evoke or suppress these emotions. Generalizing 
those examples, the Article then proposes three viable strategies that 
courts can use to enhance the operation of the emotions most necessary 
for self-restraint: a framework that welcomes, rather than ostracizes the 
moral emotions; a rhetoric that clarifies the pertinent social norms; and 
a content that thoughtfully portrays the harm caused to the 
exploited party. 
Notably, the Article’s conclusion is different from existing 
approaches to unconscionability. Instead of joining those who 
recommend more or less use of the unconscionability principle by the 
judiciary, the Article emphasizes the content of judicial decisions. With 
an understanding of the emotions that shape human behavior, courts 
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can better direct their expressive powers. They can successfully evoke the 
emotions that facilitate conscience-based self-restraint of market actors. 
In this way the legal system can help people internalize a norm against 
market exploitation, thereby fostering a more ethical market 
environment. Importantly, using the law to support individuals’ 
conscience may eventually decrease the need for future interventions in 
the market’s operation. 
People tend to do what they think is morally correct, and to avoid what 
they think is immoral.1 
Rightness and wrongness . . . are things we feel.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In a market society characterized by record-level socio-economic 
inequalities, many business opportunities for exploitation arise. 
Greed competes with conscience; to exploit or not to exploit 
becomes a pressing question. Each time greed wins, an oppressive 
contract is born, depriving the exploited party of limited resources, 
further enriching the exploiter, and increasing the ever-growing gap 
between the powerful and powerless. 
Such was the case of Henrietta Charley as described in a 2014 
decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico.3 Ms. Charley 
worked hard to make ends meet. A mother of three and a medical 
assistant earning $10.71 per hour working in a medical center, she 
found herself under financial distress and had to take out a loan of 
$200 “to buy groceries and gas.”4 Although she had never done this 
before,5 taking the loan was easy. The lender’s storefront was one of 
many similar businesses crowding Farmington’s Main Street, only a 
few minutes’ drive from Ms. Charley’s workplace.6 Inside, employees 
 
 1.  Paul Rozin, Freedom, Choice and Public Well-Being: Some Psychological Perspectives, 
51 SOC. SCI. & MOD. SOC’Y 237, 243 (2014) [hereinafter Freedom, Choice and Public       
Well-Being]. 
 2.  JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 13 (2007). 
 3.  State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014). 
 4.  Id. at 664. 
 5.  Id. at 666–67. 
 6.  This conclusion relies on a Google Maps search of the area of Ms. Charley’s 
workplace, the San Juan Regional Medical Center at Farmington, New Mexico. 
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of “Cash Loan Now” were trained to offer a swift ten-minute 
lending process to anyone with a job.7 They were instructed to 
misrepresent the interest rate in daily terms ranging “between $1.00 
and $1.50 per day” for every one hundred dollars borrowed.8 The 
lender’s manuals further scripted the interactions with the 
borrowers, requiring employees to conceal the payment schedule 
and never explain that the loan was interest-only.9 It was only much 
later that Ms. Charley realized that “she would have to make sixteen 
biweekly payments of $90.68 each before any of her payments would 
be allocated toward her principal.”10 The terms of the schedule had 
been purposely buried in her file.11 Misleading Ms. Charley and 
taking advantage of her financial distress and lack of experience, the 
lender awarded her a $200 loan that in reality carried a total finance 
charge of $2,160.04, equal to a 1,147.14 APR (annual percentage 
rate).12 When sued, the lender cited a loophole, arguing that since it 
intentionally converted its loan products from payday loans to 
“signature” loans,13 Ms. Charley’s loan agreement was legal and 
therefore should not be invalidated by courts.14 
Unfortunately, Ms. Charley’s loan agreement is by no means 
rare. In the world of fringe banking—the exploding industry of 
high-cost loans such as payday and auto-title loans—borrowers can 
only get credit under predatory terms, at sky-high costs that worsen 
their vulnerable financial state. Despite borrowers’ seeming consent 
to such loan agreements, the marks of exploitation15 are obvious: 
 
 7.  King, 329 P.3d at 666. “Borrowers also testified that loan origination at 
Defendants’ stores took about 10 minutes and was a hurried ‘sign here, sign there’ process,” 
id., explaining the lender’s policy to “lend exclusively to people who provide proof of steady 
employment but who, by definition, are either unbanked or underbanked.” Id. at 663. 
 8.  Id. at 667. 
 9.  Id. at 667–68 (describing the lenders policy). 
 10.  Id. at 667. 
 11.  Id. (“The store manual instructed, ‘PRINT OUT THE AMORTIZATION 
SCHEDULE FOR THE FILE, BUT NEVER GIVE ONE TO A CUSTOMER!’”). 
 12.  Id. at 664. 
 13.  Id. at 663–64. 
 14.  Id. at 673–75. 
 15.  Efforts to define exploitation in general and contractual exploitation in particular 
are abundant and have occupied full-length monographs. See, e.g., RICK BIGWOOD, 
EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACTS (2004); MARK R. REIFF, EXPLOITATION AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
IN THE LIBERAL CAPITALIST STATE (2013); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996) . 
While mapping out the variety of definitions far accedes the format of an article, it is important 
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intentional targeting,16 calculated misrepresentation,17 callous taking 
advantage of others’ distress,18 and the imposition of egregious 
interests and fees.19 
How should the law respond to exploitative market behaviors 
that yield predatory contracts? By and large, our legal system 
delegates the problem to the judiciary. Admittedly, many greed-born 
contracts slip under the legal radar because the exploited parties 
 
to emphasize that most theorists agree that the existence of the consent of the exploited 
subject is not negating the existence of exploitation. On this point, see the discussion of 
“consensual exploitation” in Exploitation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 
20, 2001), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/#2. For the purposes of this 
Article, I adopt one of the many definitions that agree on this point. Professor Mark R. Reiff 
defines economic exploitation “as ‘the unjust extraction of value from another as part of a 
voluntary exchange transaction not otherwise prohibited by law.’” REIFF, supra at 27. This 
choice is motivated by two important points. First, what seems to be a voluntary exchange can 
be exploitative due to an inequality of bargaining power that allows the stronger party to gain 
an extra value from taking advantage of the weaker party. Second, exploitation exists beyond 
illegality in a manner that supports the importance of the unconscionability principle in 
fighting exploitation. 
 16.  Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities 
to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y, 165, 168 (2010) 
(describing various marketing practices used by lenders to target minorities for predatory loans 
and citing a payday lender who “testified ‘[w]e [sic] seek out low-income African-American 
and Latino neighborhoods because we know that this is where our most profitable client base 
is located’.”); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FRAUD AND ABUSE ONLINE: HARMFUL 
PRACTICES IN INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING 13 (2014), www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/2014/10/fraud-and-abuse-online-harmful-practices-in-internet-payday-
lending (citing a New York online borrower who said, “I’m getting texts, and I’m getting 
phone calls, and I’m getting emails, and I’m getting all of this stuff.”). 
 17.  Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and 
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (2014) (summarizing how lenders intentionally and 
sophisticatedly exploit borrowers’ bounded rationality by misrepresenting the economic 
meaning of loans, for example by “lowering the price of the salient contract terms, while 
packing more of the overall contract cost into nonsalient, poorly understood terms”). 
 18.  Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: 
Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1126–27 
(2008) (explaining that payday lenders target “clientele of limited means” and that “[b]y one 
estimate, approximately 90% of payday lending revenues are based on fees stripped from 
trapped borrowers”). 
 19.  Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal 
Usury Cap, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 273 (2014) (explaining that the short-term, high-cost 
loans offered by fringe banking are based on interest rates ranging from 300% per annum to 
over 1,000% per annum—rates that are sometimes 100 times higher than what is offered in the 
mainstream credit market); see also Peterson, supra note 18, at 1127 (“Industry observers 
estimate that, even after charge-offs, most payday lenders earn a return on assets between ten 
and twenty times greater than traditional banks.”). 
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simply lack the means, monetary and otherwise, to seek legal help. 
The exploiters, on the other hand, frequently rely on the law for 
enforcement of their contracts. Any time litigation ensues, courts 
must choose between greed and conscience, exploiters and exploited, 
and enforcement and non-enforcement. Courts are faced with a 
difficult dilemma: ignore the problematic behavior of the stronger 
party or follow their sense of moral correctness and refuse to support 
unscrupulous behavior. There is no doubt that courts are authorized 
to invalidate unfair contracts. Legislation and precedents have 
established a variety of legal tools that the courts may use, foremost 
among which is the unconscionability20 principle.21 There is, 
however, a greater doubt—and an unresolved debate—on the 
normative question of how courts should utilize this principle.22 
On one side of the debate stand those who argue for minimal 
use of the unconscionability principle. Believing that any interference 
in the free market is undesirable, theorists argue that judicial 
intervention in the name of fairness is paternalistic and harmful.23 
Courts influenced by these concerns have chosen to operate a formal 
version of the unconscionability principle and have often used it to 
raise the bar for invalidating contracts.24 On the other side of the 
 
 20.  U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 21.  I use the term “principle” rather than “doctrine” to adopt Professor Eisenberg’s 
important argument that the unconscionability idea is broader than what arises from black-
letter law and is a fundamental principle of modern contract law. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (forthcoming Sept. 2016)); see also Aditi Bagchi, 
Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 136 (2008) (“While 
unconscionability is a narrow doctrine in the common law, its underlying principles are of 
wider significance because many statutory interventions in contract law are essentially 
transaction-type-specific rules of unconscionability.”). 
 22.  Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit 
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 941 (1986) (“[U]nconscionability has developed into the 
most controversial of the so-called policing doctrines in contract law.”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293 (1975). 
 24.  Following a suggestion by Professor Leff, many courts have adhered to a two-
pronged analytical structure that requires evidence of both (1) procedural inappropriateness of 
the formation process and (2) substantive unfairness of the contract’s terms. Both conditions 
must be in place in order to release a party from her seeming consent. See Arthur A. Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 
(1967); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 
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debate stand those who argue for a broad use of the principle. 
Emphasizing the need to monitor the market, jurists have argued 
that judicial intervention is crucial to protect weaker parties in 
predatory transactions and to restrain inappropriate market behavior. 
Courts that follow these ideas, such as many in California, are more 
willing to utilize the unconscionability doctrine.25 
This Article enters the debate from a unique angle: it considers 
in what way judges should use the unconscionability principle as 
opposed to how often. Its main goal is to find a way to effectively 
discourage—rather than unintentionally encourage—market 
exploitation. The Article departs from the conventional discourse in 
several important ways. Rather than critiquing the doctrinal 
characteristics of unconscionability, the Article illuminates its deep 
connection to the idea of conscience. Instead of highlighting the 
power of courts to sanction inappropriate behavior, it stresses the 
expressive power of law and its ability to incentivize people to follow 
their conscience and choose to behave appropriately. As an alternative 
to focusing on economic incentives, the Article discusses the 
possibility of creating an environment that encourages self-restraint 
by evoking conscience-based behavior. Such a possibility has been 
explored outside of the unconscionability debate by Professor Lynn 
Stout in her book Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make 
Good People.26 Yet, while Professor Stout stresses at the outset that 
her book’s goal is to consider behavior and not emotions,27 this 
Article adds to the discussion an understanding of the crucial role of 
the emotions. The Article uses the fresh approach of “law and 
emotions”28 against the conventional belief in legal rationality. It 
 
73, 75 (2006) (arguing that courts have been “increasingly rigid in their application of a two-
prong unconscionability test”). 
 25.  This is particularly true in contexts where parties suffer from larger gaps in 
bargaining power, for example, arbitration provisions in employment and consumer contracts. 
See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and 
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995) (describing and criticizing California’s generous use 
of unconscionability). 
 26.  LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE (2010). 
 27.  Id. at 12 (“[W]e are indeed referring to behavior, and not to emotions. We are 
talking about acts, not feelings.”). 
 28.  See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 1998 n.1 (2010) (“‘Law and emotions’ scholarship explores the 
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introduces the power of law to impact market actors’ decision 
making by influencing the emotions that drive conscience. 
On one hand, the Article demonstrates how the law can 
unintentionally impair the emotions that facilitate conscience-based 
decision making, thus worsening socio-economic problems. On the 
other hand, it proposes three constructive steps that courts can take 
in order to evoke such emotions. Following this proposal would 
allow courts to support the operation of conscience and foster self-
restraint in the market. Notably, the idea introduced by this Article 
circumvents the problem of less versus more use of 
unconscionability: thoughtfully crafted, judicial decisions can help 
market actors to internalize a norm against exploitation, thereby 
yielding more self-restraint and less need for judicial interventions. 
Existing discussions of unconscionability have tended to stick to 
the question of the economic incentives created by judicial decisions, 
ignoring the possibility that people may change their behavior in 
response to the way such decisions frame, discuss, and evaluate 
questionable market behaviors. Drawing on studies in psychology 
and the neurosciences, this Article presents such a possible impact. 
Underscoring the historical and contemporary importance of 
conscience in unconscionability decisions, it conceptualizes the 
phenomenon of market exploitation as a moral dilemma and not 
merely a rational choice. Parties that are presented with an 
opportunity to profit through exploitation do not have to seize the 
moment in full. Rather, they have the equally available option to 
restrain themselves and contract fairly, acting less selfishly and more 
prosocially. One can, for example, lend another a sum of money for a 
variety of interest rates, all profitable to the lender, without choosing 
an egregious percentage. Tempting as the opportunity to exploit can 
be, virtually any contracting party has the ability to listen to the voice 
 
reciprocal relations between emotions and the law. It reflects pluralism along several 
dimensions: (1) attributes of cognition: law and emotions scholarship values the affective 
dimensions of cognition as fully as the classically rational, rather than understanding them as 
‘other’ or as potentially problematic departures from rationality; (2) cognate literatures: law 
and emotions scholarship may draw on economics, biological science, and more objectivist 
social sciences, but it also draws on literature, history, philosophy and other humanist 
disciplines; (3) normative goals: law and emotions scholarship engages law not simply, or even 
primarily, to correct the cognitive responses of legal subjects in favor of greater rationality; it 
aims to modify law more fully to acknowledge the role of specific emotions, or to use law to 
produce particular  emotional effects.”). 
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of conscience and exercise self-restraint. How, then, can the law 
work to support and encourage such self-restraint? What legal 
response to abusive market behavior might yield less future abuse? 
Having framed those new questions, the Article responds to 
them by proposing that judicial decisions condemning exploitative 
bargaining practices have important, unrecognized potential: to 
galvanize self-restraint by participating in the social cueing of 
conscience. The Article conceptualizes conscience as a metaphor for 
the dynamic interaction between changing social norms and shifting 
individual beliefs. It is here that we form personal normative 
judgments.29 Within this framework the Article envisions law as an 
important mediator between society and the self. If conscience is 
perceived “[a]s a voice straddling the inner and the outer,”30 law can 
operate to amplify this voice. It can assist market actors in exercising 
self-restraint in the face of temptation to profit from exploitation.31 
As argued in this Article, the law can, for example, discourage 
transgression by a clear articulation of the relevant social norm, 
thereby reminding us that misbehavior may come with a price: the 
painful experience of guilt. Such a legal reminder of the prospect of 
guilt draws on the deep connection between conscience and the 
moral emotions. To appeal to the conscience is by definition not 
merely or even mainly a cognitive exercise. Rather, conscience, as an 
inner judge, reflects a dialog with our environment in which 
emotions are the leading form of communication. To use the words 
of the second epigraph, “[r]ightness and wrongness . . . are things 
we feel.”32 
Expanding and deepening the conversation to include the moral 
emotions is imperative for two main reasons. First, since emotions 
dictate the operation of conscience and thus the probability of self-
restraint, we must understand the impact of law on the affective 
domain in order to fully assess how legal decisions may influence 
future behaviors. Second, the emotions have a normative value for 
 
 29.  See, e.g., PAUL STROHM, CONSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2011) 
(discussing the many meanings of conscience while covering a vast variety of approaches, 
periods, cultures, and languages). 
 30.  Id. at 11. 
 31.  See id. at 94 (“[T]hrough the conscience we judge that something should be done 
or not done.”) (quoting AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1.79.13). 
 32.  PRINZ, supra note 2, at 13. 
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anyone interested in curbing greed.33 Even those who ideologically 
support the free market may appreciate the opportunity to decrease 
exploitation, not by increasing the frequency of intervention, but 
rather by creating the ethical and affective conditions that would 
encourage individuals to regulate their own behavior. Indeed, lab 
studies of human behavior in transactional contexts have shown that 
most people expect fairness of exchanges and strongly condemn 
greedy behavior.34 
The Article unfolds in four parts. Part I is dedicated to the 
relationship between the unconscionability principle and the concept 
of conscience. It explores the rise and fall of the bond between the 
two, how the principle was born joined to concerns of conscience 
but increasingly broke away from them and has reached a point 
when many believe unconscionability has little to do with conscience 
or morality. Part II explores the connection between conscience and 
emotions. It draws on interdisciplinary studies to explain the impact 
of moral emotions on self-restraint and on choices between selfish 
and prosocial behaviors. This Part focuses on the human ability to 
anticipate feelings of guilt as a key to self-restraint. Part III applies 
the understanding developed in Part II to the debate concerning the 
way courts use the unconscionability principle. It illustrates how the 
framing, content, and rhetoric of judicial reviews of exploitive 
contracts can influence the moral emotions of people and thus shape 
their future behavior. Part III does so by offering a careful textual 
analysis juxtaposing two contemporary decisions: one that has the 
power to disable the moral emotions required for the operation of 
conscience and one that can induce those emotions and support 
conscience-based decisions. Part IV generalizes these examples and 
proposes a normative argument: if courts have the ability to either 
discourage or encourage conscience-based and emotionally-informed 
decision making they should aim at fostering rather than suppressing 
non-exploitative behavior. To achieve such a goal, this Part proposes 
a concrete model for applying the unconscionability principle 
effectively. This model is clear and easy to implement and is 
 
 33.  See Eric A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2002). 
 34.  Shaun Nichols, Emotions, Norms, and the Genealogy of Fairness, 9 POL. PHIL. & 
ECON. 275, 287 (2010) (discussing lab-based evidence of an equal-division norm in an 
ultimatum game setting including explicit anti-greed responses such as writing a note to the 
exploiters saying “you greedy bastard”). 
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comprised of three characteristics: framing that welcomes, rather 
than ostracizes, the moral emotions; rhetoric that clarifies, rather 
than clouds, pertinent social norms; and content that thoughtfully 
portrays the harm caused to the exploited party. 
Overall the Article calls for a renewed and redefined linkage 
between the judicial employment of the unconscionability principle 
and the concept of conscience. Given the power of law and the 
authority of judges, the review of market behavior in the manner 
proposed below has the power to encourage the operation of the 
moral emotions, facilitate the working of conscience, support self-
restraint, and improve the fairness of the market. 
Furthermore, the Article’s contribution is not limited to the 
context of market exploitation. It suggests more broadly that in 
many other contexts, judicial decisions, as well as other legal signals, 
could and should be evaluated in terms of their impact on human 
emotions. Despite the fact that emotions drive behavior, such impact 
is currently under-acknowledged—a status that this Article seeks to 
change by marking a path for a more nuanced understanding of the 
operation of law and a better use of its given power. 
I. CONTRACTS AND CONSCIENCE 
Many others have described the development of the 
unconscionability doctrine and reviewed its success with approval or 
with different shades of criticism.35 My goal in this Part is not to 
recap this important scholarship. Rather, in what follows, I trace the 
voice of conscience in the legal unfolding of the unconscionability 
principle. I emphasize the adoption and rejection of the notion of 
conscience in judicial decisions to enforce or invalidate predatory 
contracts and by theorists. At the same time, I set aside decisions and 
works that offer doctrinal analyses but do not illuminate the role of 
morality. Admittedly, the focus on conscience presupposes that there 
is something morally wrong about the exploitation of others via the 
mechanism of contracts: the intentional use of one human being as a 
tool for the advancement of another’s interests, in violation of the 
dignity of the exploited.36 
 
 35.  Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 
GEO. L.J. 1383, 1422–24 (2014). 
 36.  BIGWOOD, supra note 15, at 489–90. 
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A. Contracts in the Courts of Conscience 
The unconscionability principle is tied to the idea of conscience 
in its roots. It was most famously articulated by the “courts of 
conscience”—England’s courts of equity.37 In 1751, Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke explained that courts of conscience would not 
enforce agreements that “no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair 
man would accept on the other.”38 Importantly, he also described 
those undeserving agreements by directly referring to conscience, 
naming them “unequitable and unconscientious bargains.”39 And, 
although it was not the first time that courts have refused 
enforcement of unfair contracts,40 it was certainly one of the first 
times the refusal was theorized in conscience-oriented terms. Lord 
Hardwicke’s words—which emphasize the potential conflict between 
contract and conscience—have proven appealing to generations of 
judges and legal commentators on both sides of the pond.41 For over 
a several centuries those words have been cited numerous times,42 
thus transferring an idea born in the “courts of conscience” to all 
courts, regardless of their operation under equity or law.43 As the 
 
 37.  See, e.g., Dennis R. Klinck, The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience, 31 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 206, 208 n.9 (2005) (citing the case of Ewing v. Orr, (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34 (HL) 40, in 
which the court said, “The courts of equity in England are, and always have been, courts of 
conscience.”); see also id. at 211 (stating that “no doubt historically conscience and equity were 
intimately allied, even synonymous”). 
 38. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch) 100. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. For an example of the “ancient roots” of unconscionability, see Stephen E. 
Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for Contractual 
Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 334–43 (2010) (citing sources which connect the idea to 
ancient Jewish and Roman law); see also Schmitz, supra note 24, at 80–82. 
 41.  The first American case to refer to the words of Lord Hardwicke in Earl of 
Chesterfield is Powell v. Spaulding, 3 Greene 443, 465 (Iowa 1852). The Supreme Court has 
adopted the full definition in Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889). 
 42.  To date the latest case citing the definition in full (including the archaic term 
“unconscientious bargains” as opposed to only referring to the Earl of Chesterfield case) is 
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W. Va. 646, 678–80 (2011), vacated, Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
 43.  See the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hume, 132 U.S. at 410, citing Lord 
Hardwicke’s definition and other cases that had followed it, and affirming the lower court’s 
finding that “[t]hese citations are sufficient to show that in suits upon unconscionable 
agreements the courts of law will take the matter in their own control, and will, without the 
intervention of courts of equity, protect the parties against their enforcement.” 
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idea came to be known as “unconscionability,” alluding to Lord 
Hardwickes’ “unconscientious bargains,” conscience has remained a 
central part of the decision to enforce a contract or not. As early as 
1889 the U.S. Supreme Court referred to “unconscionable” 
contracts, opening its decision with the celebrated judgment of Lord 
Hardwicke.44 Even earlier, albeit without reference to its English 
origins, the term “unconscionability” was already in use by American 
courts as a defined legal reason for unenforceability.45 It can be 
contended, therefore, without much risk, that the link between the 
linguistic rhetoric of the unconscionability principle and the idea of 
conscience is an important core concept, reflecting a tradition of 
hundreds of years. The following section will investigate this link 
more closely. 
B. Contracts that Shock the Conscience 
Courts’ recurrent use of phrases that encompass the word 
“conscience” in enforcement discussions is another marker of the 
importance of ethics in the context of invalidating unconscionable 
contracts. Courts repeatedly explain that enforcement is to be denied 
when the contract, or one of its terms, “shocks the conscience” or is 
“conscience-shocking.” Significantly, this conscience test has been 
used for centuries. My research found that the test was already in use 
in an early case from 1816,46 and in 1836 it was reported and 
analyzed as a leading test by Judge Story in his highly influential 
book Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administrated in 
England and America. Stating the rules of equity of his time, Judge  
Story wrote: 
[T]here may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a 
bargain as to demonstrate some gross imposition or some undue 
influence, and in such cases Courts of Equity ought to 
 
 44.  Id. at 411. 
 45.  See Morris & Essex R.R. v. Sussex R.R., 20 N.J. Eq. 542, 563 (1869) (“To the full 
extent of these powers this contract could be made, and was to that extent within their scope, 
(that is, apart from any question of illegality, or want of consideration, or unconscionability, or 
want of authority of the directors to make it, against the stockholders) . . . .”)  
(emhasis  added). 
 46.  Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, 23 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (“[T]he inequality 
amounting to fraud, must be so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the 
judgment of any man of common sense.”) (emphasis added). 
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interfere . . . . [S]uch unconscionableness or such inadequacy 
should be made out as would (to use an expressive phrase) shock 
the conscience.47 
Judge Story’s words have gained much eminence throughout the 
years and have been quoted, with or without adequate reference, by 
numerous judges and scholars.48 The shocks-the-conscience test has 
not only been in constant and frequent use, it has also survived many 
modern attacks on the doctrine of unconscionability. In fact, it is still 
utilized today by judges and scholars who are greatly aware of its 
historical origins.49 
Certainly, the ongoing legal reference to conscience when 
unconscionability is argued and discussed is in and of itself of great 
importance to this Article’s argument. However, beyond this 
rhetorical phenomenon, some more nuanced observations are in 
order to lay the groundwork for a later focus on the emotions that 
impact the conscience. 
First, it is often unclear whose “conscience” is at stake and who 
exactly should be shocked by the behavior of the stronger party, the 
harm to the weaker party, or the predatory terms of the contract. 
Frequently, courts have overlooked the question altogether, phrasing 
the test so abstractly that it ignores the possibility that people’s 
 
 47.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED 
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 256 (13th ed. 1886) (emphasis added). 
 48.  Since Judge Story’s words were quoted in full in the known case of Eyre v. Potter, 
56 U.S. 42 (1853), some have attributed them to the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Friedman, 
supra note 40, at 339 (citing Eyre, 56 U.S. at 60) (“The ‘unconscionableness or inadequacy’ 
must be such as would ‘shock the conscience’–an ‘expressive phrase’ that retains a hold on the 
current unconscionability doctrine.”). 
 49.  For an example of a court decision, see Rudman v. Rudman, No. 200789-03, 
2013 WL 3336829, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013) (“An unconscionable bargain has 
been regarded as one ‘such as no [person] in his [or her] senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair [person] would accept on the other.’ While 
the inequality of said bargain has been described as being ‘so strong and manifest as to shock 
the conscience and confound the judgment of any [person] of common sense.’”) (citations 
omitted). It is noteworthy that the court cited modern cases which themselves cited the words 
discussed here from Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch) 100, and 
Osgood, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, respectively. For an example of a scholarly work, see Philip Cantwell, 
Relevant “Material”: Importing the Principles of Informed Consent and Unconscionability to 
Analyze Consensual Medical Repatriations, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 249, 257 (2012) 
(stating, with reference to Osgood, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, that “[u]nconscionability is a tool originally 
used in courts of equity to prevent the enforcement of contracts that are so unreasonable as to 
‘shock the conscience’”). 
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perception of conscience may differ. For example, in one discussion 
of an arbitration term the court said, “It is self-evident that such a 
provision [which] is unduly harsh and one-sided, defeats the 
expectations of the nondrafting party, and shocks the conscience.”50 
Other courts and commentators have linked the test to the 
conscience of the reasonable person, explaining that to prove 
unconscionability one should show “the type of inequality that 
would shock the conscience of a person of common sense.”51 This 
approach clearly attempts to justify unenforceability by suggesting 
that conscience is an objective perspective shared by people of 
common sense. 
However, by and large, courts using this test have suggested that 
it is the conscience of the court itself that should be shocked. As one 
commentator stated, “The court should . . . ask whether the 
provision was so unfair at the time of execution that it would shock 
the conscience of the court.”52 From this perspective, enforcement of 
unconscionable contracts necessarily means judges’ participation in 
something that is against their conscience. Interestingly, while most 
judges who use this approach have referred rather generally to the 
“conscience of the court,”53 others have acknowledged the 
differences between individual judges. As one judge candidly stated: 
“Although the exorbitant rates on a fully secured loan, under the 
circumstances of this case, do not shock the conscience of the 
majority, it [sic] does mine.”54 Notably, this judiciary-based version 
of the shock-the-conscience test adds a new justification for non-
enforcement. Not only would enforcement conflict with the 
conscience of many people of common sense, it may also risk the 
reputation and reliability of courts. 
Second, despite hundreds of years of use, it remains unclear what 
definition of conscience courts and scholars of all generations have 
 
 50.  Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 202 (Cal. 2013)  
(emphasis added). 
 51.  Santini v. Robinson, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2878, 13–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) 
(emphasis added), modified, 891 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2009). 
 52.  Prince, supra note 25, at 484 (emphasis added). 
 53.  See Simar Holding Corp. v. GSC, No. 2645/04, 2010 WL 1855760, at *10 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 10, 2010), rev’d, 982 N.Y.S.2d 592 (2011). 
 54.  Cheshire Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1150 (Conn. 1992) 
(Berdon, J., dissenting). 
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(or had) in mind while applying the test. In some cases, 
“conscience” was used synonymously with the word “moral.”55 Most 
importantly to the argument made hereafter, other courts have 
pointed out that the question of whether a contractual arrangement 
is unconscionable or not may depend on varying external 
circumstances, including the norms dictated by law, culture, and 
religion. For example, in an interesting early nineteenth-century 
case, an American court expressed reluctance to follow the rules of 
England and refused to find a loan agreement unconscionable due to 
the high interest rates charged by the lenders.56 Highlighting the 
differences between the countries, the American court stated, “It is 
true that, in conformity to the canons of the church, all interest 
whatever upon money loaned was long prohibited in England.”57 
However, due to historical, ideological, and political variations, the 
court emphasized its commitment to independent decision-making 
regarding “what rate of interest should be deemed contrary to good 
conscience”58 and refused to blindly follow norms produced at other 
times and in other societies. 
Third, it seems that over the years the application of the shock- 
the-conscience test has gone through significant changes. 
Traditionally, until the late 1970s, the fact that a contract (or the 
behavior that led up to a contract) was conscience-shocking had 
served as a justification to refuse enforcement, especially if the 
litigation took place in the courts of conscience. A judge who was 
morally revolted by an abusive contract was “shocked,” and 
therefore, had to avoid participating in what the judge found to be 
immoral. Still, for at least the last few decades, it seems that the role 
of this test has been changing in accordance with the decline of the 
unconscionability principle. By and large, the conscience test’s 
function has changed from a reason for unenforceability to a 
justification of enforceability. In other words, the test has turned into 
a way to raise the bar required for non-enforcement. Increasingly, 
 
 55.  See, e.g., Thomas v. T & T Straw, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 495, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting F.N. Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 132 Ga. App. 257, 260 (1974)) (“An 
unconscionable contract is one abhorrent to good morals and conscience. It is one where one 
of the parties take a fraudulent advantage of another.”). 
 56.  Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42 (1819). 
 57.  Id. at 43. 
 58.  Id. at 44. 
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courts apply the test with more emphasis on the aspect of “shock” 
than on the component of “conscience”. Unsurprisingly, the court’s 
insistence on shock, more often than not, ends in an enforcement of 
contracts that might very well be immoral but are nevertheless not 
extreme enough to cause a shock.59 For example, in one case, the 
court reflected explicitly: “Needless to say, a ‘shocks the conscience’ 
standard is a high bar.”60 And, although some exceptions exist,61 as 
the years pass, it does seem as if more and more is required to justify 
a refusal to enforce a contract on the basis of a shock to 
the conscience.62 
Finally, it is important to admit the limits of rhetoric. In the cases 
at hand, even if courts reference conscience while deciding 
enforcement issues, it does not necessarily follow that one can find a 
significant review of moral dilemmas in the court’s discussion. 
Indeed, many courts simply quote earlier cases in a traditionalist 
 
 59.  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 40, at 347 & n.164 (arguing that “[t]here are 
countless recent examples of courts using either or both of these standards, or variations 
thereof, in assessing-and frequently rejecting-claims of unconscionability,” and citing many 
recent cases to support the argument). 
 60.  In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Fee Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 810 F. Supp. 
2d 1060, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 61.  In early times a judge said that the test requires a gross inadequacy of the valued 
exchanges. Wiest v. Garman, 3 Del. Ch. 422, 442 (Del. Ch. 1870) (citing the “shock the 
conscience” test and adding that “[i]n all the cases in which inadequacy of price or value has 
been treated as a material consideration, it has been of this gross character” and that “[t]he 
inequality has not been less than half the value”). When a mentally limited buyer asked for 
relief for paying much more than market value for a farm, the court used its interpretation of 
the “shock the conscience” test to decide that, although they “appeal strongly to [the court’s] 
personal sympathies,” the circumstances do not justify relief as the undisputed inadequacy was 
not large enough to meet the required threshold. Id. at 444. For an exception in recent times, 
see Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 638–39 (Wash. 2013) (citing the shocks-the-
conscience test and immediately after finding the shortening of a limitation period of 
employees from three years to fourteen days unconscionable). 
 62.  My focus here is on tracing the changes of the use of the “shock the conscience” 
test, and I am therefore less concerned with the emergence of the formal test of procedural 
and substantive unconscionability. Although some have argued that it is the formality of this 
test that made unconscionability a relic, I believe that theoretically such formal framework can 
equally allow a narrow or a broad understanding of the unconscionability principle. This two-
prong test can be filled with conscience-based content or deny such content altogether. In 
other words, I am not concerned here with the formalistic framework but with its deeper 
substance. For a rich description of the formalistic framework see Melissa T. Lonegrass, 
Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012) (offering a detailed description of the procedural and substantial 
prongs and their interaction under the case law of different jurisdictions). 
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manner and do not truly engage in an inquiry of the appropriateness 
of the behavior that led to a predatory contract. These courts 
acknowledge the existence of the unconscionability principle without 
actually participating in shaping its content. It is mainly for this 
reason that despite the evident rhetorical link between 
unconscionability and conscience there is a need for additional 
theoretical inquiry. As the two following sections will demonstrate, 
the place of conscience in deciding enforceability questions has long 
been disputed, not only among judges, but also among scholars. 
C. The Anti-Conscience Approach 
The long tradition of judicial refusals to enforce contracts on the 
grounds of their conflict with the commands of conscience has 
provoked strong opposition. For example, in the one and only case I 
was able to find in which the Seventh Circuit mentioned the shock-
the-conscience test, it did so to dismiss the test, as well as condemn 
the mixture of contracts and morals it represents more generally. “It 
is a strength rather than a weakness of contract law,” declared Judge 
Posner, “that it generally eschews a moral conception of 
transactions.”63 It is therefore better, according to Judge Posner, to 
discuss real contractual issues rather than “[r]uminating on the 
meaning of ‘unjust’ and ‘unconscionable.’”64 
Generally, the call to separate law, particularly the law of 
contracts, from questions of conscience and morality, is neither 
unique to the Seventh Circuit nor new.65 Oliver Wendell Holmes was 
the most influential modern jurist to speak against the integration of 
law and morality. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, he 
wrote that “[n]owhere is the confusion between legal and moral 
ideas more manifest than in the law of contract.”66 However, 
Holmes’s theory did not seem to stop courts from using and 
developing the unconscionability principle. Nor did it trigger a 
 
 63.  Classic Cheesecake Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 546 F.3d 839, 845–46 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 64.  Id. at 846. 
 65.  Judge Posner’s words echo an earlier influential manifestation of a similar idea by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who famously wrote, “I often doubt whether it would not be a 
gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether.” See Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897). 
 66.  Id. at 462. 
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scholarly attack on the principle. It was much after, in 1965 and 
following the watershed unconscionability case of Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company67 that things began to change. 
The most influential attacks on the Williams decision, and the 
power of the unconscionability principle for which it stands, came 
from legal scholars drawing on an economic analysis of the law. Out 
of their many arguments, I will emphasize only the arguments 
central to the concept of conscience.68 First, the opponents 
challenged the framework of the unconscionability principle. Law 
and economics commentators, as well as judges who apply the law 
and economic analysis to their decisions, use market, not moral 
terms, to frame the limits of enforceability. To these legal thinkers 
there is no moral dilemma of fairness or justice, but rather a question 
that solely depends on the operation of the free market. They believe 
that competition is necessary for the market to operate optimally and 
therefore resist legal interventions in the course of such competition. 
In other words, for the market players to succeed, they need to be 
free to pursue their own self-interests and should not be, nor should 
they be expected to be, their “brother’s keeper.”69 Indeed, from this 
market-centric perspective, acting out of greed and driving a hard 
bargain are not flaws but rather valuable market skills.70 And, as long 
as the other party consents, there is no possible outcome that can be 
immoral. Put differently, where consent appears to exist, it is not 
appropriate for courts to ask whether market behaviors are wrong or 
right. Instead, contractual terms are detached from the very human 
context that brings them into existence; they are merely a product of 
 
 67.  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 68.  In doing so, I am setting aside several other objections to unconscionability, such as 
on the basis of uncertainty or paternalism. See, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of 
U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 287–89 
(2000) (noting the uncertainty surrounding courts’ applications of the 
unconscionability doctrine); Fleming, supra note 35, at 1431 & n.314 (pointing out that 
“[c]ritics of the doctrine labeled it paternalistic” and discussing such objections). 
 69.  Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 
F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Chocolate Chip Cookie Co.] (Posner, J.) (“Contract 
law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on 
the philosophy that I am my brother’s keeper.”). 
 70.  See Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(reasoning that “an allegation of greed is not defamatory” because “sedulous pursuit of self-
interest is the engine that propels a market economy”). 
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risk allocation and pricing. Such a market-based framework directly 
rejects conscience and morality’s place in the context of contracts. 
Indeed most, if not all, who strongly believe in a free-market 
ideology would further reject a conscience-based impulse to protect 
exploited parties. 
Second, scholars and judges in the law and economics camp also 
disagree that courts’ refusals to enforce contracts may have a positive 
impact, helping people draw the line between conscionable and 
unconscionable market behaviors. While the drafters of the UCC 
who codified the unconscionability principle believed that 
formalizing this principle would help to “inhibit the businessman or 
attorney from automatically asserting all conceivable rights in all 
transactions,”71 legal economists foretold the exact opposite 
response. They criticized decisions such as Williams v. Walker-
Thomas, not for their outcome, but for their hypothetical, 
prospective impact on the market. They predicted that 
unenforceability would neither deter powerful market players from 
taking advantage of powerless people, nor decrease the amount of 
unconscionable contracts. 
Commentators, such as Richard Epstein and Richard Posner, are 
influential examples of the aforementioned critique. They argue that 
stronger parties will respond to unenforceability by using even 
harsher terms the next time around, choosing to further raise their 
prices, or refraining from dealing with weaker parties altogether.72 
They caution that utilizing unconscionability (or any other fairness-
based scrutiny for that matter) will ultimately damage the same 
 
 71.  Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky 
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 158 (2012) (citing John A. Spanogle, Jr., 
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 941 (1969)). 
 72.  See Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(Posner, J.) (“It is a detriment, not a benefit, to one’s long-run interests not to be able to 
make a binding commitment.”); Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., 970 F.2d at 282 (Posner, J.) (“The 
more difficult it is to cancel a franchise, the higher the price that franchisors will charge for 
franchises. So in the end the franchisees will pay for judicial liberty and everyone will pay for 
the loss of legal certainty that ensues when legal principles are bent however futilely to 
redistributive ends.”); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 421 (2009) (analyzing Judge Posner’s decision in Chocolate Chip 
Cookie Co. and concluding that “[i]n essence, Judge Posner asserted that any judicial favoring 
of the weaker party for redistributive reasons would fail because it would be undone through 
overriding provisions dictated by the stronger party in the contract.”); Richard Epstein, 
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 306–08 (1975). 
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powerless parties it purported to help. Judge Posner, who apparently 
has never accepted an unconscionability claim in his entire judicial 
career,73 explained that it is only for the benefit of the party seeking 
relief because this party “may actually be made worse off by a rule of 
nonenforcement of hard bargains; for, knowing that a contract with 
him will not be enforced, merchants may be unwilling to buy his 
clothes or lend him money.”74 Or, as Robin West has tartly 
paraphrased the conclusion of such anti-intervention admonitions: 
“if you want to help poor and uneducated buyers, for heaven’s sake, 
hold them to their contracts.”75 
The gloomy hypothesis that using unconscionability will actually 
make things worse has greatly impacted judges and has played a 
major role in the decline of the principle from the end of the 
twentieth century through the present day.76 As one commentator 
observed, “After the newly-codified unconscionability doctrine was 
put to use in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., it was largely 
halted by scholars, the law and economics movement, and a fear of  
judicial activism.”77 
Before concluding the discussion of the impact of law and 
economics thinkers’ rejection of conscience, it is very important to 
note that this seemingly amoral approach actually reflects a 
distinctive perception of morality. Just because it draws heavily on 
money and numbers as a basis for its argument, it is not, as some 
 
 73.  This is based on a search in the “ALLCASES” database on WestlawNext, 
conducted on July 1, 2013, using the following query: “ADV: JU(POSNER) & 
UNCONSCION!.” The result was 51 cases, which presumably captured all of Judge Posner’s 
opinions containing the root “unconscion-.” 
 74.  Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 75.  Robin L. West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in NOMOS LIII: PASSIONS AND 
EMOTIONS 243, 258 (James E. Fleming ed., 2013). 
 76.  The emergence of behavioral law and economics analysis—with its recognition of 
bounded rationality and the limits of the traditional law and economics approach, which relies 
on individuals’ rationality—adds much to the general support of unconscionability. However, 
it changes less regarding the point made here. Although behavioral law and economics has 
yielded more arguments favoring the use of unconscionability, it still suggests to do so based 
on bounded rationality and not due to moralistic concerns. For a pioneering analysis from this 
perspective see Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics 
Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 26 HAW. L. REV. 441 (2004). 
 77.  Preston, supra note 71, at 159; see also Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing? 
What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to 
Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 779 (2014) (reporting a success in 23% of the 
cases in which unconscionability was discussed). 
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tend to think, more objective or more scientific than approaches 
which do assign power to judges to draw lines between right and 
wrong behaviors. For the most part, the free-market attacks on the 
unconscionability doctrine are ideological attacks with strong moral 
features, and by their very existence, they put conscience at the core 
of the debate. 
No other source proves this point better than the honest writings 
of Judge Posner himself. Recall that in the 1986 case of Amoco Oil, 
Judge Posner stated that vulnerable parties “may actually be made 
worse off by a rule of nonenforcement of hard bargains.”78 Six years 
later, in the 1992 case of Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., he repeated this 
idea, contending, “Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably 
shift the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they 
can only make contracts more costly to that side in the future.”79 In 
a short dissent, Judge Cudahy sarcastically depicted Judge Posner’s 
thesis that helping weaker parties will hurt them as an “exhilarating 
alchemy of economic theory.”80 Two decades later Judge Posner 
reflected on this squabble, describing it as a debate grounded in deep 
ideological and political differences. He explained that his opinion 
stems from conservative ideology while Judge Cudahy’s dissent 
represents his liberal beliefs.81 Importantly, Judge Posner further 
explained that disagreements of this kind “are more likely to reflect 
ideological differences than differences in ‘legal’ analysis  
narrowly defined.”82 
Put more broadly, the decline of unconscionability should be 
contextualized as a trend that is “chronologically in sync with the 
political triumph of neo-liberalism.”83 Moreover, it is evident from 
the rhetoric used by those who challenge the unconscionability 
principle that it touches moral nerves even for those who contest its 
 
 78. Amoco Oil Co., 791 F.2d at 522. 
 79. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 80.  Id. at 283 (“Apparently, the legislators had not read enough scholarly musings to 
realize that any efforts to protect the weak against the strong would, through the exhilarating 
alchemy of economic theory, increase rather than diminish the burden upon the powerless.”). 
 81.  See Richard A. Posner, A Heartfelt, Albeit Largely Statistical, Salute to Judge 
Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (2012). 
 82.  Id. at 363. 
 83.  Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 667 (2007). 
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role as setting moral limits on market behavior. From admitting that 
certain jurisdictions are “unfriendly to the defense of 
unconscionability”84 to declaring that unconscionability is the free 
market’s “covert enemy,”85 the intense resistance reveals the depth of 
the debate. It also further demonstrates that even calls for an amoral 
application of the law are themselves far from being moral-free and 
represent a specific set of values. 
D. The Pro-Conscience Approach 
Several leading scholars offer theoretical support for the idea that 
conscience should limit enforceability and that courts should utilize 
the unconscionability principle to that end. In light of my current 
focus, I will call their arguments the “pro-conscience approach.” 
These scholars, with Seana Shiffrin and Robin West at the forefront, 
have compellingly responded to Holmes and the later legal 
economists’ arguments that law and morality should be kept separate 
and a moralistic understanding of unconscionability should 
be avoided. 
Pro-conscience commentators usually begin their discussion of 
unconscionability by highlighting a tenet similar to the one I 
outlined earlier: that—by its own name, history, and conventional 
understanding—the standard of unconscionability both must and 
does incorporate a concern with morality.86 Next, they argue that 
ethical content requires judges to apply moral standards such as 
unconscionability, routinely drawing on their moral sense or “moral 
conscience.”87 Indeed, writing in the UK—at the birthplace of the 
unconscionability principle—one scholar argued that “Private law 
should prevent people, by force if necessary, from acting in ways that 
 
 84. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 85. Arthur Allen Leff, Thomist Unconscionability, 4 CAN. BUS. L.J. 424, 427 (1979). 
 86. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues 
of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222 (2010); West, supra note 75, at 252; Schmitz, supra 
note 24, at 75 (arguing that amoral approaches ignore “the history and philosophy of 
unconscionability,” that the doctrine’s role “is protecting societal values and norms of morality, 
fairness, and equality,” and that these values and norms “rely on context, common sense, 
and conscience”). 
 87.  West, supra note 75, at 253–54. 
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harm their fellow humans. One good way of doing so . . . is to get 
them to listen to their inner guide to morality, ie their conscience.”88  
Moreover, West argues that to ignore the possibility of immoral 
exploitation and enforce contracts regardless of whether or not they 
are appropriate necessarily means that the judge is not being “true to 
the law.”89 It would also mean that the courts and the state are 
publicly demonstrating “complicity with exploitation,” a possibility 
that Shiffrin has both argued and demonstrated to be a primary 
concern of many judges.90 Being moral actors themselves, judges 
simply “have no business coming to the aid of immoral business 
practices.”91 Thus, when courts face an enforceability dilemma, they 
have a duty to decide whether a party’s behavior “did or did not 
conform to norms of decency,”92 a duty which they should not avoid 
or attempt to escape.  
Pro-conscience commentators have also replied to specific facets 
of their opponents’ arguments following the decline of 
unconscionability. For example, in response to arguments regarding 
unwarranted intervention and paternalism, Professor Eisenberg has 
recently argued that unconscionability as a basis for non-enforcement 
is a very mild form of intervention and the bare minimum that the 
state owes its citizens. “Under that doctrine,” he writes, “the 
government forbids nothing and commands nothing. It simply says 
to the promisee, ‘If you can accomplish your ends without our 
assistance, fine. But don’t ask us to help you recover a pound 
of flesh.’”93 
Additionally, pro-conscience literature offers several important 
counterarguments to legal economists’ main and most deterring 
objection—that unenforceability would not help, and instead harm, 
 
 88.  Irit Samet, What Conscience Can Do for Equity, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 13, 20 (2012). 
 89.  Id. at 20, 89. 
 90.  Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 229–30 (2000) [hereinafter Shiffrin, 
Unconscionability Doctrine]. 
 91.  West, supra note 75, at 262. 
 92.  Id. at 265. 
 93.  EISENBERG, supra note 21. Note that Eisenberg’s words echo old words of the 
courts of conscience and follow the logic of the equity doctrine of “clean hands.” See also 
Shiffrin, Unconscionability Doctrine, supra note 90, at 229–230 (arguing that when courts 
deny enforceability they do this, at least in part, not out of paternalism but as a result of 
self regard). 
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the less powerful parties who seek its protection. First, it points out 
that there is no evidence to support the idea that stronger parties 
would indeed respond to the non-enforcement of contracts as 
predicted by the law and economics analysis, i.e. by insisting on 
making even less decent contracts or not contracting at all. The 
question, as Shiffrin has reminded us, requires some evidence 
regarding human nature, which is currently lacking.94 
Second, pro-conscience advocates suggest that even if stronger 
parties do respond in this manner, this should not result in courts’ 
insistence on enforcing unconscionable contracts. The fact that this 
possibility exists does not alone require courts to react by 
“facilitating exploitative contracts.”95 And, as West has emphasized, 
since judges are not legislators, they should focus on the dispute 
immediately before them instead of speculating about the creation of 
correct incentives for the future.96 Furthermore, while working with 
the unconscionability doctrine, judges should not make predictions 
relying on economic tools,97 but rather focus on a morally-grounded 
review of the contract and the behavior which led to its creation. 
Third, the pro-conscience literature counters the prediction of 
legal economists regarding the future impact of enforceability 
decisions, rejecting the assumption that unenforceability may make 
things worse. The literature goes so far as to argue that the opposite 
is conceivable: that the enforceability of unconscionable contracts (as 
opposed to their unenforceability) is itself the judicial response that 
would carry a negative impact.98 In other words, if there is any future 
damage (or cost) coming from enforceability decisions, it is more 
likely to come from judges affirming wrongful behaviors that result 
in predatory contracts than from judges invalidating contracts. As 
Shiffrin has briefly mentioned, and as this Article seeks to further 
develop, state approval of wrongful contracts might come with a 
heavy price.99 Such official endorsement of transgressions is 
 
 94.  See Shiffrin, Unconscionability Doctrine, supra note 90, at 233–34. 
 95.  Id. at 234. 
 96.  See West, supra note 75, at 279. 
 97.  See id. at 249–50. 
 98.  See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 708, at 720 (2007). 
 99.  See id. 
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dangerous to the environment or culture within which we all live 
and function.100 
This last argument is especially promising since it uses the 
master’s tools to challenge the master’s argument. It is precisely this 
gloomy prophecy of negative impact that legal economists have 
touted as an attack on unconscionability, which should instead 
support its use. The legal economists’ leading objection might lose 
its power if it were possible to explain why and how enforcement of 
exploitative contracts entails significant risks and heavy social costs. 
The remainder of this Article takes up this ambitious task. 
E. The Dilemma of Unconscionability 
Can and should judges attempt to use unconscionability to draw 
a line between acceptable and unacceptable market behaviors? As this 
Article has so far shown, the legal tools exist. Unconscionability, as 
both a doctrine and a broader principle, is recognized and available 
for judicial use.101 The debate, however, concerns the desirability of 
utilizing it to respond to contracts that shock the conscience, and, as 
described above, such use has become contested over the years. 
Nonetheless, what was recently referred to as “the rise and fall of 
unconscionability,”102 is far from being a settled result. Rather, it 
raises the question of whether, and to what extent, judicial 
invalidation of unconscionable contract is desirable. 
This broad question encompasses two different debates which 
are often combined but worth separating. The first debate is purely 
ideological. It focuses on the role that the law, and judges in 
particular, play in a capitalist society. In this debate the attack on 
unconscionability has less to do with conscience and much more to 
do with politics. As Judge Posner explained in the context of his 
 
 100.  See id. 
 101.  An exception was recently created by the new arbitration jurisprudence created by 
the Supreme Court. Under this jurisprudence courts must enforce arbitration agreement and 
cannot utilize the unconscionability principle to invalidate them due to a new and broad 
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The leading cases creating this new 
understanding of the FAA are AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) and 
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). For an analysis of this 
exception see Hila Keren, Undoing Justice: The 2nd Rise of the Freedom of Contract and the Fall 
of Equity, CANADIAN J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. (forthcoming 2016). 
 102.  Fleming, supra note 35, at 1390. 
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debate with Judge Cudahy,103 the different approaches to utilizing 
unconscionability stem from a broader disagreement between 
conservatives and liberals concerning interventions in the free market 
to conservatives who hold fast to their strong, free-market beliefs. 
For the most part, I would like to set this ideological 
controversy aside. 
The other debate concerns assumptions regarding human nature 
and behavior. At its core lies the question of how people respond to 
judicial invalidation of exploitative contracts. At this junction, pro-
conscience and anti-conscience thinkers sharply disagree and predict 
contradictory outcomes. While law and economics scholars believe 
that powerful parties will respond to such judicial decisions by 
worsening their behavior, others, such as Shiffrin and West, suggest 
that the opposite is true. However, the suppositions—on both sides 
of this debate—are very abstract and suffer from an overwhelming 
lack of support. As a result, judges are justifiably confused and torn 
between their natural wish to do justice, and the loud warning that 
by doing so they will only make things worse. 
The current debate regarding the role of the unconscionability 
principle is thus severely lacking and limited. To continue the 
conversation more fruitfully we need to learn more, much more, 
about the possible impact judicial decisions regarding wrongful 
market behavior might have on market players conducting future 
transactions. We must look beyond economic impact and ask 
ourselves what shapes human moral decision-making and how our 
legal system can discourage rather than encourage market 
exploitation. The coming Part aims to fill the current void in the 
debate by focusing on the operation of emotions in the setting of 
moral decisions. 
II. CONSCIENCE AND EMOTIONS 
How might enforcement decisions impact the moral judgment of 
those presented with an opportunity to exploit others in the future? 
This Part takes the first step towards answering this question by 
exploring what in general might encourage market actors to draw on 
their conscience and exercise more self-restraint in their dealings. 
 
 103.  Posner, supra note 81. 
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The next step will be to connect the interdisciplinary discussion 
found in this Part and apply it to the legal debate regarding the 
unconscionability principle. In contrast to most arguments in this 
debate, the following discussion is free of concerns regarding 
paternalism and judicial activism. The focus is only on whether it is 
possible to encourage stronger market players to choose to exercise 
self-restraint. The more self-restraint exercised by market players, the 
less judicial action is needed (regardless of whether one sees such 
action negatively or not). 
A. Exploitation as a Product of Moral Judgment 
Contractual exploitation is a market behavior that results from 
human beings making moral judgments. The stronger party in a 
given market situation has an opportunity not only to profit from a 
deal, but also to exploit the other party far beyond the fair and 
profitable terms of a similar deal made between more equal parties. 
But as Judge Posner once suggested, the fact that an opportunity 
exists does not mean one has to take full advantage of it.104 The 
space between recognizing the opportunity to exploit, and the 
decision to do so, is a space for moral judgments. 
For example, loan officers operating in the subprime market 
recognized that many consumers would sign any loan agreement 
offered to them regardless of the harmfulness of the terms. One 
officer was quoted saying, “When you’ve got an elderly black 
woman, you can pretty much sell them anything you want.”105 In 
such a moment there is a choice that needs to be made: to exploit or 
not to exploit. This is when moral judgment is required. Even if a 
corporation can charge an egregious interest rate on a loan or impose 
the kind of one-sided arbitration which would surely defeat the other 
party, to draw on two exploitative market practices, ultimately we call 
upon human beings to make the decision whether to take up the 
opportunity or to exercise self-restraint. 
 
 104.  RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 249 (2009) (“But the existence of an opportunity is not the same 
thing as the decision to exploit it.”). 
 105.  MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS 
AND WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA–AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 88 (2010). 
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In highlighting this space—the moment in which one is 
confronted with the choice between right or wrong, possesses 
freedom to stand at the fork in the road, and chooses to take the less 
gainful path—I consciously start the discussion in a manner that 
deviates from legal economists’ starting point. I reject the 
economists’ leading assumption that, given a choice, people will 
choose the more profitable option no matter what; that is, selfishly 
select—regardless of context and circumstances—to make more 
money, suffer fewer costs, have more rights, and carry fewer duties. I 
will later discuss studies that refute the assumption of unyielding 
selfishness. However, for now the point is more modest: a belief that 
even if exploitation of others is possible, some people may choose the 
less  exploitative option. 
At this stage, understanding exploitation in moral terms is key to 
the progression of my analysis. If exploitation is an immoral 
behavior,106 then the emergence of an exploitative contract is a 
product of a moral decision to act selfishly and without any 
consideration for the resulting harm to others. Similarly, refraining 
from exploitation, and contracting more fairly (or at least less 
unfairly), is a product of a moral decision to act more prosocially. 
Assuming that exploitation is socially and morally objectionable, a 
new question then must be addressed: What may encourage people 
to restrain themselves and choose not to take advantage of others, 
despite circumstances that allow them to do so? Connecting 
contractual exploitation with conscience—as suggested in Part I—
the following sections explain what factors may help the operation of 
conscience and promote a decision not to exploit. 
B. The Impact of Social Cues on Conscience 
The idea of conscience sometimes evokes an inner voice, a judge 
residing inside each one of us.107 It therefore also suggests that the 
process of moral deliberation—between one and one’s conscience—
is internal and insulated from the outer world. Often, it also suggests 
that conscience is preset, static, and fixed. However, the above is an 
 
 106.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 107.  Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Jiminy Cricket: A Commentary on Professor Hill’s Four 
Conceptions of Conscience, in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 53, 66 (Ian Shapiro 
& Robert Adams eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1998). 
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utterly misleading conceptualization of the human conscience, and in 
any case, one that would be hopelessly inoperable in the 
legal context. 
Professor Lynn Stout has brought to law a different 
understanding of conscience.108 Drawing on behavioral studies with 
emphasis on experimental games,109 Stout has argued that the 
human conscience is influenced by ever-changing social cues, and 
therefore, is a product of an interactive and dynamic process between 
us and the various environments we occupy. Rejecting the argument 
attributed to Holmes that humans are inherently “bad,”110 she has 
explained that people are neither always good nor constantly bad, 
but rather can and do shift between selfish and prosocial 
behaviors.111 This understanding opens up the possibility of 
deliberately influencing people’s moral judgments, what Stout calls 
“cultivat[ing] conscience.”112 
It goes without saying that in order to cultivate conscience, one 
needs to know more about the susceptibility of the individual 
conscience to social cues. We must become better at predicting 
which cues have the potential to decrease selfish behavior and 
increase prosocial behavior. Stout has initiated such a project 
predicated on the idea that individuals do not randomly choose 
between right or wrong. Instead, their choices are influenced “rather 
predictably, by certain noneconomic cues and variables collectively 
described as ‘social context.’”113 
One famous experiment demonstrated how simple changes in 
social context result in significant changes in moral behavior. In this 
study, parents who arrived late to collect their children, forcing 
teachers to stay after closing time, were notified of a new fine to be 
 
 108.  See STOUT, supra note 26. 
 109.  Stout is using results from mainly three types of experimental games: social 
dilemma, ultimatum, and dictator. See id. at 84–91. 
 110.  Stout’s reference to Holmes seems to assume that he believed that people are 
essentially bad. See id. at 23–26. However, some scholars have disputed such understanding of 
Holmes’s “bad-man” theory and argue that for the most part it is misrepresented and 
misunderstood. See Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’ Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2069 (2011). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See STOUT, supra note 26, at 22; see also id. at 117–18, 236–37. 
 113.  Id. at 236. 
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paid for being ten or more minutes late for pick up.114 Instead of 
deterring parents from being late—as economists would predict—the 
new fine triggered a significant increase in parents’ lateness.115 The 
common understanding of the surprising results is that the fine did 
not deter parents because it functioned as a price, changing “the 
perception of people regarding the environment in which they 
operate.”116 Pricing the overtime care turned the once-relational 
issue of inconveniencing the teachers into a market situation. This in 
turn allowed parents to feel less concerned about the impact of their 
behavior on the caregivers (and their own reputation). Instead, being 
charged money for extra hours of care made the interaction more 
transactional and thus, more detached and legitimate. In the 
researchers’ words: “No guilt or shame (depending on the degree of 
internalization of the social norm) can be attached to the act of 
buying a commodity at will.”117 
Another experiment supports the findings of the day-care 
centers’ study in a contractual setting. This experiment offers 
evidence that people are more willing to breach a contract when 
their contract awards the other party a defined right to receive 
liquidated damages.118 One important explanation for this inclination 
is that putting a price tag on the questionable behavior of a breach 
legitimizes, and therefore encourages, a selfish behavior.119 Again, 
the enhanced transactional framing decreases the prospect of 
self restraint. 
Stout’s contribution to the body of work on predicting how 
social cues will impact moral judgments is what she calls “the three-
factor model.”120 According to this model, the cultivation of 
conscience depends by and large on three social cues: “instructions 
from authority; beliefs about others’ unselfishness; and perceived 
 
 114.  Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000). 
 115.  Id. at 1, 8. 
 116.  Id. at 3. 
 117.  Id. at 14. 
 118.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological 
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 659 (2010). 
 119.  See id. at 664–65. 
 120.  STOUT, supra note 26, at 21. 
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benefits to others.”121 Let me (briefly) explain the first two factors 
that are pertinent to exploitative market behavior.122 
First, by “instructions from authority” Stout means that most 
people will simply follow instructions. The more authoritative the 
instructors, the more likely people will follow them. This 
phenomenon can be negative—think, for example, about obedience 
to commands to commit war crimes.123 However, as many 
experimental games have consistently shown, the same human 
inclination can also be utilized to foster prosocial behavior—many 
people will respond to an authoritative order to behave prosocially 
by obeying the order rather than by ignoring the order and 
acting selfishly.  
In one experiment, for example, a group of players in a social 
dilemma game involving money transfers was told that they were 
going to play “the ‘Community Game,’” while another group was 
told that they were going to play “the ‘Wall Street Game.’”124 The 
groups otherwise played an identical game. The outcomes, however, 
were significantly different. In correlation with the name of the 
game, players of the game under the community title demonstrated 
much less selfish decisions than those who played it under the Wall 
Street title.125 Even though the games’ contrasting names carried a 
somewhat implicit message, far weaker than any clear order from an 
authoritative source, the effect was still potent. Therefore, to foster 
prosocial behavior it would seem that authorities should tell people 
to collaborate. As Stout admits, not everyone will obey, but as long 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Stout’s third factor of “perceived benefits to others” relates to the ability to induce 
people to act less selfishly by increasing the positive effect of their behavior. See id. at 21, 110–
14. However, this third factor seems to lie beyond the limits of my project. I am only 
interested here in the cultivation of self-restraint, i.e., the avoidance of causing harm to others, 
rather than in the promotion of active altruism. My focus is what Stout calls “passive altruism.” 
Id. at 14. 
 123.  Id. at 104 (describing examples of negative results of over-obedience, such as 
Millgram’s known experiment and the obedience of Germans to the commands of the Nazis 
during World War II). 
 124.  Id. at 105. 
 125.  Id. (demonstrating how “people change their behavior in social dilemmas in 
response to mere hints about what the experimenter desires”). 
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as most will heed these instructions, this is “a powerful force”126 in 
the cultivation of conscience—and a very straightforward one. 
Second, the known conformity bias can influence the operation 
of conscience. Experiments show that people will choose between 
selfish and prosocial behavior in accordance with what they believe 
others are doing or expected to do. Therefore, giving people 
information regarding the choices made by others similarly situated 
can influence the choices the former will make.127 After Stout’s book 
was published, a study entitled “Is Dishonesty Contagious?” added 
evidence regarding the strength of the conformity bias in the context 
of moral transgressions.128 Previous studies had shown that people 
demonstrate “herd behavior” in deciding between selfish and fair 
allocations of money.129 The dishonesty study, in contrast, gave 
subjects a choice to earn money, not from acting selfishly but from 
lying.130 Significantly, this recent study showed that even when faced 
with a highly moral dilemma people will still follow the herd.131 This 
recent study further supports the influence of the environment, or 
culture, on seemingly personal choices as it demonstrates that in 
making moral decisions people have “a hard-wired trait that tells 
them to ‘do as others do’ in these types of situations.”132  
Stout’s behavioral model is normatively valuable and will be 
revisited. However, before moving to the normative arena it is 
important to note that the model is consciously setting aside an 
essential component of the issue: the role of emotions.133 The 
remainder of this Part is thus dedicated to adding the missing piece 
 
 126.  See id. 
 127.  Id. at 108; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, 
and Law, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 339, 343 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005) (“If individuals 
can be made to believe that others are inclined to contribute to public goods, they can be 
induced to contribute in turn, even without recourse to incentives.”). 
 128.  Robert Innes & Arnab Mitra, Is Dishonesty Contagious?, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 
722 (2013). 
 129.  STOUT, supra note 26, at 108. 
 130.  Innes & Mitra, supra note 128, at 725. 
 131.  Id. at 727. 
 132.  Robert Innes & Arnab Mitra, Is Dishonesty Contagious?, 
https://arefiles.ucdavis.edu/uploads/filer_public/2014/03/27/innes-honesty042810.pdf. 
 133.  STOUT, supra note 26, at 12 (“[W]e are indeed referring to behavior, and not to 
emotions. We are talking about acts, not feelings.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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to the puzzle, investigating the affective side of making moral 
judgments. Because our conscience-based responses are not a 
product of an intellectual exercise, I believe that without taking the 
emotions into account, no meaningful normative suggestions can 
be made. 
C. The Role of Emotions 
Around the same time the unconscionability doctrine emerged, 
Immanuel Kant was advancing the argument that our emotions 
interrupt and limit our ability to engage in moral deliberation and 
make appropriate moral judgments.134 Kant’s profound influence has 
had theoretical and practical consequences for many generations. 
One result that is of particular interest here is the emergence and 
success of the metaphor of homo economicus—a hypothetical market 
player who makes decisions rationally, devoid of emotions. Following 
this approach, it was recommended both within and outside of the 
legal arena that efforts be made to put the emotions aside while 
making moral decisions. Such strong belief in rationality had a 
powerful influence on legal thinkers and played a role in the 
separation of the unconscionability principle from its roots in the 
concept of conscience. The fact that many contemporary courts 
apply the idea of unconscionability so formalistically and 
parsimoniously accords with the aversion to anything that seems to 
deviate from pure rationalism. 
Outside of the legal world, however, things have been rapidly 
changing in the last two decades or so. Many researchers and 
theorists from a variety of disciplines—all seeking to comprehend 
processes related to moral judgments—have been increasingly 
making a counter-Kantian argument and supporting it with a 
growing body of evidence. As a whole, they have made a case for the 
salient role that emotions play in the course of moral decision 
making. They have argued that “[r]ightness and wrongness . . . are 
 
 134.  PRINZ, supra note 2, at 20 (describing Kant as arguing that “in making successful 
moral judgments, we would generally do well to ignore our passions”). Of course Kant was 
not the first. As described by Jonathan Haidt, former “high priests of reason,” including Plato 
and Aristotle, presented models of thought in which reason ruled over passions. See Jonathan 
Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852 (Richard J. Davidson 
et al. eds., 2003). Such models and thoughts most certainly influenced thinkers such as Kant. 
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things we feel,”135 and have followed up by suggesting emotion-
based theories of moral judgments. Specifically, the Kantian account 
of conscience has been criticized for its narrow focus on the human 
intellect and portrayal of processes of moral reflection with excessive 
austerity. In contrast, the so-called “sociological turn in theories of 
conscience” advocates an alternative account of conscience that 
includes the cultural and psychological mechanism by which 
conscience arises.136 
For a while it seemed as if the pendulum had shifted from 
believing, with Immanuel Kant, that reason controls our moral 
decision making, to believing the opposite, as did David Hume: that 
emotions control the moral processes, rendering reason a post-hoc 
phenomenon.137 However, most recent works reject the epistemic 
rivalry between a cold and rational reasoning process and an 
emotion-laden intuitive course of action. They argue instead for a 
significantly more integrative process in which cognitive and affective 
properties work in tandem to achieve or restore a moral equilibrium 
and yield a moral judgment.138 Integrative theories view emotions as 
constituting moral judgments (or moral judgments as reflecting the 
operation of emotions). To judge an act as wrong means to feel 
emotions of disapproval towards it: anger or disgust if the actor is 
not we, and guilt or shame if the act is our own.139 Simultaneously, 
the integrative approach does not deny the role of cognitive 
reasoning—for example, in regulating the emotions.140 Since law has 
generally ignored the role of moral emotions altogether, it is not 
necessary at this stage to choose between the emotive-dominance 
approach and the more integrated theory. Merely recognizing the 
important role that emotions play in shaping moral decision making 
marks a great step forward. 
 
 135.  PRINZ, supra note 2, at 13. 
 136.  Elizabeth Kiss, Conscience and Moral Psychology: Reflections on Thomas Hill’s “Four 
Conceptions of Conscience,” in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 107, 
at 73–75. 
 137.  See, e.g., Haidt, supra note 134. 
 138.  See Chelsea Helion & David A. Pizarro, Beyond Dual-Processes: The Interplay of 
Reason and Emotion in Moral Judgment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS 109 (Jens 
Clausen & Neil Levy eds., 2015). 
 139.  Jesse J. Prinz, Constructive Sentimentalism: Legal and Political Implications, in 
NOMOS LIII: PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS, supra note 75, at 8. 
 140.  Helion & Pizarro, supra note 138, at 116–17. 
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Although there is no single definition of what constitutes the 
moral emotions, many agree that the term loosely captures those 
emotions that are most involved in the making of moral decisions. In 
his famous article, The Moral Emotions, psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
has defined moral emotions as “those emotions that are linked to the 
interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons 
other than the judge or agent.”141 Efforts to list the moral emotions 
and classify them have followed, yielding a variety of results, but no 
straightforward consensus. The literature includes self-blaming 
emotions such as guilt and shame, and other-condemning emotions 
such as anger and resentment. It also mentions self-praising 
emotions like pride and other-praising emotions such as gratitude, 
while compassion and empathy are discussed as other-
suffering emotions.142 
Lists and definitions aside, for many disciplines the main puzzle 
is how the moral emotions work to influence moral judgments. To 
begin answering, we can follow Robert Frank’s guiding words: “If 
we are to think clearly about the role of moral emotions in moral 
choice, we must consider the problems that natural selection 
intended these emotions to solve.”143 As those words suggest, moral 
emotions serve an evolutionary goal. More specifically, their role is 
to keep humans together, despite the possibility of self-destruction 
due to individual short-term selfishness. For example, while the need 
to survive periods of famine may provoke an individual to steal from 
her friend, emotions such as guilt, shame, and regret have enabled 
“an effective moral system” that inhibits the selfish impulse and 
motivates people “to forgo self-interest for the common good.”144 In 
that sense, moral emotions work “in the service of socialization”145 
and civilization. 
 
 141.  Haidt, supra note 134, at 853 (emphasis omitted). 
 142.  The different lists and debates regarding the inclusion of specific emotions in those 
lists are beyond the scope of this article. 
 143.  Robert H. Frank, The Status of Moral Emotions in Consequentialist Moral 
Reasoning, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 42, 45 
(Paul J. Zak. ed., 2008) [hereinafter MORAL MARKETS]. 
 144.  Id. at 45–46. 
 145.  Paul Rozin, Moralization, in MORALITY AND HEALTH 379, 384 (Allan M. Brandt 
& Paul Rozin eds., 1997). 
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The importance of moral emotions in promoting prosocial 
behaviors has led scholars to sort moral emotions from other 
emotions based on the extent to which the emotions create an active 
tendency to behave prosocially.146 Feeling compassion, for example, 
triggers a tendency to help suffering others and contributes to the 
growth of social bonds.147 Shame, in turn, helps not by motivating 
action but by increasing tendencies to withdraw and refrain from 
harm. Notably, negative emotions still serve a positive role: 
preserving social norms by increasing the cost of social deviation.148 
Moreover, as some researchers have noted, the importance of a fully 
functioning moral emotion system is in balancing selfish and 
prosocial inclinations.149 Such a role can be gleaned from examining 
psychopaths and the mentally ill who suffer, respectively, from too 
little or too much prosocial emotion.150 
Many disciplines have increasingly offered evidence that moral 
emotions influence moral decision making; exactly the kind of 
evidence currently missing from the unconscionability debate. What 
some have called “[t]he empirical turn in ethics” has benefited from 
a growing body of neurobiological and psychological work, which in 
turn has fueled philosophical debates regarding the meaning of the 
findings.151 For example, scientists aided by new technologies (such 
as functional magnetic resonance imaging) have proved that subjects 
demonstrate higher activity in brain regions associated with emotion 
when presented with challenging moral dilemmas, for example, 
choosing whether or not killing one person to save five others is a 
 
 146.  See, e.g., Ilona E. de Hooge, Seger M. Breugelmans & Marcel Zeelenberg, Not So 
Ugly After All: When Shame Acts as a Commitment Device, 95 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL., 933 (2008) (“Moral emotions . . . are assumed to motivate prosocial 
interpersonal behaviors”). 
 147.  Haidt, supra note 134, at 862. 
 148.  See, e.g., de Hooge, Breugelmans & Zeelenberg, supra note 146 (“Moral emotions 
make selfish behavior less attractive, thereby promoting behavior that is beneficial to others 
within one’s social group.”). 
 149.  Erdem Pulcu, Roland Zahn & Rebecca Elliot, The Role of Self-blaming Moral 
Emotions in Major Depression and Their Impact on Social-economical Decision Making, 4 
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1 (2013) (“Healthy functioning of a moral emotion system forms the 
basis of balancing selfish needs with those of other people.”). 
 150.  See generally Roland Zahn et al., Moral Emotions, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF HUMAN AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 491 (Jorge Armony & Patrik Vuilleumier eds., 2013). 
 151.  See Prinz, supra note 139, at 3. 
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permissible act.152 The fact that emotions not only contribute to the 
process, but also sway its outcomes, has been proven in many 
experiments that deliberately induce particular moral emotions prior 
to presenting subjects with a need to make moral choices.153 Taken 
together, these experiments demonstrate that decisions are 
significantly influenced by the induced emotion. 
In the wake of the growing consensus regarding the influence of 
the moral emotions, researchers and theorists have also started to 
offer specific pieces to the puzzle of how these emotions impact our 
moral decision making. Following the principal proposition that 
moral emotions’ role is to restrain individual egoism and to support 
social cooperation, it has been suggested that, in general, negative 
moral emotions, for example regret, increase the cost of moral 
transgressions of a selfish nature, while positive moral emotions, such 
as pride, encourage people to be considerate of others.154 Beyond 
this general explanation, several more concrete explanations have 
been offered. 
First, moral emotions play an informative role. They offer 
feedback that, in hindsight, helps individuals correctly interpret the 
situation.155 For example, a feeling of shame associated with finding 
but not returning a wallet, informs or puts us on notice that an event 
with moral salience has just occurred and thus calls for a more 
careful deliberation. 
Second, moral emotions help us to prioritize and maintain moral 
clarity. They keep us focused on the moral significance of the event 
and sometimes even amplify it, thereby suppressing an inclination to 
 
 152.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is Deontology a Heuristic? On Psychology, Neuroscience, 
Ethics, and Law (2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/13548959 (describing the findings of fMRI studies that 
compared brain activity in response to two classical moral dilemmas—the footbridge and the 
trolley—both involving the need to cause death of a person in order to save five others). 
 153.  Luis M. F. Martinez et al., Behavioural Consequences of Regret and Disappointment 
in Social Bargaining Games, 25 COGNITION & EMOTION 351 (2011) (describing experiments 
with different emotion induction procedures that dictated the outcomes of different 
bargaining games: regret increased whereas disappointment decreased prosocial behavior). 
 154.  Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Moral Sentiments: A Behavioral Economics Approach, in 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE ECONOMICS OF DECISION MAKING 73, 73–75 (Alessandro 
Innocenti & Angela Sirigu eds., 2012) [hereinafter Moral Sentiments]. 
 155.  See Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of 
Emotion- Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 
473 (2000). 
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avoid difficult decisions.156 In the wallet example, the anticipated 
emotions of shame or pride may urge us toward either decision to 
return the wallet or keep its content for ourselves, but nevertheless 
they discourage holding onto the wallet while delaying the decision. 
Third, moral emotions often accelerate the making of moral 
judgments and make the decision-making process more efficient and 
effective. Usually emotions arise faster than the conclusion of 
cognitive deliberation, providing “quick intuitive cues” that can help 
in solving conflicts and clarifying ambiguities.157 An emerging sense 
of anger at the sight of an adult hitting a child, for example, can 
cause us to call the police more swiftly.158 
Finally, moral emotions have motivational power.159 They can 
create “action tendencies”160 and increase the chances that people 
will actually act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with their 
moral emotions. Feeling empathy toward a suffering person, for 
example, motivates a helping behavior to alleviate the suffering of 
the assisted person, as well as the distress felt by the empathizing 
helper. Inspired by pragmatists such as Adam Smith, several social 
psychologists have emphasized the value of this motivational power 
of the emotions by suggesting an approach called “feeling-is-for-
doing.”161 According to this approach, the central role of emotions 
in the decision-making process is to create a specific inclination to 
act a certain way as opposed to another. Due to its forward-looking 
and goal-based qualities, the feeling-is-for-doing approach has, I 
argue, a special normative value. And, more generally, the 
 
 156.  Elizabeth J. Horberg et al., Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal Tendency 
Approach to the Influences of Distinct Emotions Upon Moral Judgment, 3 EMOTION REV. 237, 
238–39 (2011). 
 157.  Marcel Zeelenberg et al., On Emotion Specificity in Decision Making: Why Feeling is 
for Doing, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 18, 24 (2008). 
 158.  See David Pizarro, Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral 
Judgment, 30 J. FOR THE THEORY OF SOC. BEHAV. 355, 366–67 (2000); see also Mary Frances 
Luce et al., The Impact of Emotional Tradeoff Difficulty on Decision Behavior, in CONFLICT 
AND TRADEOFFS IN DECISION MAKING 86 (Elke U. Weber et al. eds., 2001). 
 159.  Giuseppe Ugazio, et. al., The Role of Emotions for Moral Judgments Depends on the 
Type of Emotion and Moral Scenario, 12 EMOTION 579, 579 (2012) (presenting a study that 
demonstrates that “emotions influence moral judgments based on their  
motivational dimension”). 
 160.  Haidt, supra note 134, at 853. 
 161.  Moral Sentiments, supra note 154, at 76–77, 79, 81 (explaining the feeling-is-for-
doing approach). 
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motivational power of the moral emotions is of remarkable 
importance to jurists and policy makers who are interested in 
fostering moral behavior. It is thus particularly valuable when 
attempting to foster self-restraint in the face of greed. 
Understanding the specific motivational power of a given 
emotion can allow us to predict its influence on behavioral decisions. 
The opposite seems true as well: once a desired way of behavior is 
defined (here, refraining from exploitative acts) enabling or even 
eliciting the particular emotion that motivates such behavior is key to 
enhancing the probability that such behavior will occur. I will revisit 
this last point in the normative part of this Article, but first I would 
like to highlight the special role of one extremely important 
moralemotion: guilt. 
D. Guilt and Its Special Role 
Defined by many as the central moral emotion,162 guilt is of 
utmost significance in the discussion of conscience and the possibility 
of motivating self-restraint.163 As we know all too well, it is a very 
unpleasant negative emotion. And yet it is precisely the taxing nature 
of guilt that creates its leading positive role in shaping our social life. 
As philosophers have pointed out, guilt carries “the voice of 
conscience” and signifies one’s painful awareness of a transgression 
of the internalized moral norms of the “moral community.”164 As 
such, guilt is not only “a common form of emotional distress” but 
also “a common factor in behavioral decisions.”165 As this section 
seeks to explain, guilt has a proven, uncontested, and distinct ability 
 
 162.  See, e.g., Haidt, supra note 134, at 861; Moral Sentiments, supra note 154, at 74. 
 163.  See Moral Sentiments, supra note 154, at 75, 80. In her influential studies of guilt 
and shame, Professor Tangney has continuously theorized those two neighboring emotions. 
Despite their seeming similarity as moral emotions that are based on self-consciousness and are 
classified as negative emotions, Tangney’s work focuses on their dissimilarity. Her studies 
emphasize that guilt relates to a negative judgment of a behavior while shame is associated 
with negative judgment of the self. Tangney has concluded that guilt motivates prosocial 
behavior while shame tends to make people withdraw from social participation altogether. See 
e.g., JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 14, 24, 34 (2003) 
(referring directly to conscience). 
 164.  CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 
52 (2007). 
 165.  Roy F. Baumeister et al., Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
243, 243 (1994). 
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to keep selfish behavior in check and even promote 
prosocial behavior.166 
As a leading moral emotion, guilt functions along the lines 
described in the previous section. Not only does it call our attention 
to the occurrence of morally significant events, it prompts us to 
focus on these events. Most importantly, it encourages action that 
might alleviate the negative feeling such as compensating the people 
hurt by the transgression or asking for their forgiveness. 
Efforts to alleviate existing guilt are of immense importance to 
the conservation of communities and offer an evolutionary 
explanation for the existence and survival of guilt. They account for 
the ability of humans to restore their relationships with each other 
and take reparative actions aimed at sustaining the ties of their 
community after a moral crisis has taken place.167 Studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated that actual feelings of guilt limit selfish or 
unfair behavior and instead enhance prosocial behavior, such as 
enhanced donation to charities.168 One of those studies, for example, 
found that when people witnessed a student cheating and were made 
to feel guilty because they did not report it to the instructor, their 
subsequent willingness to agree to help others increased, leading to a 
reduced feeling of guilt.169 
1. Guilt aversion 
Guilt also plays a role in directing future behavior, even when 
specific harm has not yet occurred: the anticipated painfulness of 
 
 166.  See generally, Christian B. Miller, MORAL CHARACTER: AN EMPIRICAL THEORY 
29–56 (2013) (discussing how guilt is associated with prosocial behavior, including an 
increased inclination to help others); see also Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities 
Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003) (applying this idea to the legal context of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty). 
 167.  See, e.g., June P. Tangney et al., Communicative Functions of Shame and Guilt, in 
COOPERATION AND ITS EVOLUTION 485, 496 (Kim Sterelny et al. eds., 2013) (explaining how 
“feeling guilt leads to positive intrapersonal and interpersonal processes” and “[e]xpressions of 
guilt can strengthen relationships in a number of ways, especially in contexts requiring 
cooperation and interpersonal trust and based on assumptions of equity and fairness”). 
 168.  See Sally Hibbert et al., Guilt Appeals: Persuasion Knowledge and Charitable Giving, 
24 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 723 (2007) (demonstrating that guilt arousal is positively related 
to donation intention). 
 169.  See Franklin J. Boster et al., The Impact of Guilt and Type of Compliance-Gaining 
Message on Compliance, 66 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 168 (1999). 
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guilt seems to suffice.170 Anticipating the guilt that might follow 
from engaging in a particular behavior creates in most humans a 
strong motivation to escape the predicted emotional distress, 
producing what theorists call “guilt-aversion:” an inclination to 
avoid actions (or defaults) that might cause feelings of guilt.171 
Thanks to individuals’ ability to contemplate the probable emotional 
consequences when considering future behavioral alternatives, the 
effects of anticipated guilt do not depend on the existence of 
a transgression.172 
In fact, studies show that anticipated guilt may be more 
significant than its experienced variation in guiding one’s behavioral 
intentions. First, anticipated emotions in general have greater long-
term influence than experienced emotions, which tend to dissipate 
over time, and therefore are limited in their ability to direct future 
decision making.173 Second, the power of anticipated emotion, not 
experienced emotion, is sometimes amplified by a process of mental 
stimulation.174 Third, at least in the case of guilt and other emotions 
that involve emotional distress, the experienced emotion may 
interrupt the higher order of thinking required for ethical decision 
making.175 In its anticipated form, however, the operation of this 
emotion is not tied to stressful conditions and thus, “anticipating 
future emotional outcomes can help individuals make better 
 
 170.  Generally, the focus on the behavioral effects of anticipated emotions, as opposed 
to the impact of experienced emotions, is a recent development in the study of emotions. See 
Richard P. Bagozzi et al., How Effortful Decisions Get Enacted: The Motivating Role of Decision 
Processes, Desires, and Anticipated Emotions, 16 J. OF BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 273 (2003). 
 171.  See Luke J. Chang et al., Triangulating the Neural, Psychological, and Economic 
Bases of Guilt Aversion, 70 NEURON 560, 560 (2011), 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627311002996 [hereinafter Bases of Guilt 
Aversion] (explaining the guilt-aversion model and reviewing studies demonstrating that 
“people are indeed guilt averse and in fact often do make decisions to minimize their 
anticipated guilt regarding a social interaction”). 
 172.  See June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 345, 347 (2007). 
 173.  See Roy F. Baumeister et al., How Emotion Shapes Behavior: Feedback, Anticipation, 
and Reflection, Rather Than Direct Causation, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 167, 
190–91 (2007). 
 174.  See Leaf Van Boven & Laurence Ashworth, Looking Forward, Looking Back: 
Anticipation Is More Evocative Than Retrospection, 136 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 289, 
293–94 (2007). 
 175.  Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (2013) (explaining 
how distress interferes with processes of decision making). 
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decisions.”176 For the aforementioned reasons, it is now an accepted 
wisdom that anticipated emotions function as a guide to our 
prospective decisions and behaviors. 
After long years of focusing on the cognitive aspects of decision 
making, recent experimental studies have started to explore the role 
of anticipated emotions. As part of this development, much attention 
has been paid to the role that anticipated guilt plays in shaping 
individuals’ decisions regarding moral dilemmas. For example, in the 
context of deciding whether or not to register as an organ donor, 
several different studies have revealed that anticipated guilt is directly 
and positively associated with a willingness to donate.177 Of most 
relevance to contractual situations, similar findings regarding the 
cooperative impact of anticipated guilt were repeatedly reported in 
experiments structured around economic transactions. 
In a 2011 interdisciplinary study, researchers asked participants 
to engage in a trust game while mapping their brain activity.178 One 
of the study’s goals was to document how anticipated guilt operates 
and impacts the decision-making process.179 Participants were 
engaged in real social interactions with actual monetary 
consequences.180 Similar to other trust games, trustees who received 
money from investors had to decide whether to act selfishly or in 
accordance with their partner’s expectations.181 They could abuse 
their partner’s trust and keep for themselves all or most of an 
enlarged endowment or cooperatively return the original investment 
 
 176.  Xiao Wang, The Role of Anticipated Guilt in Intentions to Register as Organ Donors 
and to Discuss Organ Donation with Family, 26 HEALTH COMM. 683, 684 (2011). 
 177.  Lisa L. Massi Lindsey, Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation: An Examination 
of Appeals to Help Unknown Others Through Bone Marrow Donation, 31 HUM. COMM. RES. 
453 (2005); Wang, supra note 176. 
 178.  Bases of Guilt Aversion, supra note 171, at 561. 
 179.  Id. at 561–62. 
 180.  Id. at 562. 
 181.  See id. at 561 (“In [a typical trust] game, a player (the Investor) must decide how 
much of an endowment to invest with a partner (the Trustee . . . ). Once transferred, this 
money is multiplied by some factor (often 3 or 4), and then the Trustee has the opportunity to 
return money back to the Investor. If the Trustee honors trust, and returns money, both 
players end up with a higher monetary payoff than originally endowed. However, if the 
Trustee abuses trust and keeps the entire amount, the Investor takes a loss. The standard 
economic solution to this game uses backward induction and predicts that a rational and selfish 
Trustee will never honor the trust given by the Investor, and the Investor realizing this, should 
never place trust in the first place, and will invest zero in the transaction.”). 
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and some of its surplus.182 The guilt-aversion model predicts, 
counter to traditional economic presumptions, that players will 
refrain from selfish decisions (not returning any money or enough 
money to the investor) because they seek to not only maximize their 
profits, but also to minimize the feelings of guilt that they expect will 
arise from an abuse of their partner’s trust.183 The 2011 study 
supported this model and offered compelling evidence that 
“avoidance of a predicted negative affective state” motivates 
cooperative behavior even in the context of economic exchange.184 
More specifically, findings showed that trustees indeed sought to 
avoid guilt stemming from disappointing their investors’ 
expectations.185 They did that by first conceiving those expectations 
and then by making an effort to match them.186 Further linking their 
decisions to a guilt-aversion mechanism, participants later reported 
that they would have felt more guilt had they returned less money in 
the game.187 
Perhaps the most important accomplishment of this study was to 
illuminate the neural basis of anticipated guilt. It showed that 
participants who engaged in avoiding anticipated guilt exhibited 
patterns of brain activity distinct from those of participants who 
decided to ignore their conscience, maximize their profits, and 
knowingly disappoint their partners.188 Observing and defining the 
specific neural network involved in making decisions that minimize 
anticipated guilt allowed the researchers in this study to offer a better 
understanding of the mechanism of anticipated guilt. 
First, the researchers observed that the guilt-related brain activity 
was similar to the one associated, not only with other negative 
emotions such as anger and disgust, but also with negative 
experiences such as physical pain and social distress.189 This 
resemblance supports the theory that anticipated guilt functions as a 
 
 182.  Id. at 561–62. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 566. 
 185.  Id. at 561–62. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 566. 
 188.  Id. at 563–66. 
 189.  See id. at 567. 
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disutility, adding the cost of letting a partner down to one’s effort to 
maximize utility.190 
Second, supplementing the growing literature about the role of 
emotional decision making,191 the observed network also has given 
rise to an explanation for how anticipated guilt works. To wit, the 
guilt-related brain activity may operate neurologically to “override 
the competing motivation to maximize financial gain.”192 
Third, the guilt-related network is also remarkably similar to 
other networks that are active while making decisions to conform to 
perceived social norms. The researchers, therefore, concluded that at 
least one social function of anticipated guilt may be “to track 
deviations” from shared social expectations and to motivate 
adherence to moral rules and social norms.193 
The guilt-aversion model offers an important emotion-based 
explanation to the puzzle that is the existence of unselfish behavior. 
As opposed to other models that theorists have discussed,194 it 
highlights interpersonal and social dynamics and assumes neither that 
people are selfish by nature nor that they are purely altruistic. 
Underscoring the role of emotions in sustaining social norms, the 
model is especially promising for a legal project. It also offers 
evidence currently missing from the unconscionability debate 
regarding possible consequences of inducing anticipated guilt. 
2. Two kinds of guilt 
Both actual and anticipated guilt raise the question of what 
typifies the transgressions that trigger the emotion. Notably, recent 
 
 190.  See id.; see also Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, Guilt in Games, 97 AM. 
ECON. REV. 170 (2007). 
 191.  See Bases of Guilt Aversion, supra note 171, at 568. 
 192.  See id. 
 193.  Id. at 567. 
 194.  Id. (“The guilt-aversion model explored here is distinct to other models of social 
preference as it posits that participants can mentalize about their partner’s expectations and 
that they then use this information to avoid disappointing the partner. In contrast, other 
models conjecture that people are (1) motivated by a “warm glow” feeling and find 
cooperation inherently rewarding, (2) motivated to minimize the discrepancy between self and 
others’ payoffs, or (3) motivated to reciprocate good intentions and punish bad intentions. 
The guilt-aversion model thus provides a different psychological account of cooperation than 
other models because it incorporates both social reasoning and social emotional processing.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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studies of guilt have pointed out that this emotion encompasses two 
different kinds of affective reactions, or that two different kinds of 
guilt exist.195  
The first, called “deontological guilt” or, as I will call it here, 
“self-guilt,” typically arises out of the self-consciousness of having 
affronted the commands of moral authorities or infringed 
internalized moral norms.196 It stems from conflict with social 
norms, is aimed at the preservation of social order, and is tightly 
linked to sentiments of fear and shame.197 The second, named 
“altruistic guilt,” or as I will call it here, “other-guilt,” is the feeling 
that accompanies the realization that others were, are, or will be hurt 
due to our behavior.198 It stems from harm to others, is aimed at 
preserving interpersonal relationships, and is deeply connected to the 
ability to feel empathy.199 
Notably, self-guilt and other-guilt are not mutually exclusive, but 
rather may converge or jointly emerge from the occurrence of one 
moral event.200 For example, in the context of exploitative contracts, 
if one believes that promoting self-interests at the expense of others 
is not only forbidden by the authorities and immoral according to 
existing social norms (deontological guilt) but is also hurting weaker 
parties (altruistic guilt), then both kinds of guilt may be anticipated. 
Yet this distinction is instrumental. It can aid in understanding how 
each kind of guilt can be elicited or repressed by various different 
external factors. Specifically, factors that clarify or obscure the social 
norms regarding a given behavior are relevant to the inducement of 
self-guilt. Factors that highlight or conceal the harm to others caused 
by certain behaviors are relevant to the inducement of other-guilt. 
Recognizing that two separate kinds of guilt are at play is, therefore, 
imperative to developing an effective way to support them both in 
 
 195.  See Amelia Gangemi & Francesco Mancini, Guilt and Guilts, in RE-
CONSTRUCTING EMOTIONAL SPACES 169 (Radek Trnka et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the 
distinction between the two kinds of guilt); Barbara Basile et al., Deontological and Altruistic 
Guilt: Evidence for Distinct Neurobiological Substrates, 32 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 229, 229 
(2011) (providing “evidence for the existence of distinct neural circuits involved” in the two 
different guilt feelings). 
   196.  Gangemi & Mancini, supra note 195, at 170–71.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 170. 
 200. Id. at 169, 183. 
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moral decision making. It will later prove useful in framing two 
distinct paths by which legal actors can facilitate the operation of 
anticipated guilt. 
3. Guilt and social cues 
In a final point essential for transitioning to the normative 
discussion: guilt is not an insulated emotion that either emerges in 
individuals or not based on the power of their personal conscience. 
Guilt is susceptible to external influences, can be induced by others, 
and is highly dependent on circumstantial, social, and cultural 
contexts. This characteristic of guilt is especially relevant to 
deontological guilt due to the dynamic and ever-changing nature of 
morality. According to the known theory of moralization introduced 
by psychologist Paul Rozin, individuals’ morality is not fixed but 
rather dynamic.201 People internalize the changing norms around 
them.202 Rozin’s theory defines moralization as “the transformation 
of a morally neutral activity into one with significant 
moral weight.”203 
To briefly demonstrate this point, consider the changes in moral 
judgment ascribed to smoking in public. Whether or not one should 
and would feel guilty for smoking next to others does not only 
depend on preset personal values. Time matters. In the past, as 
reflected in television series like “Mad Men,” such activity was 
fashionable and thus a source of pride rather than guilt or shame. 
However, the reverse is true today, when the anti-secondhand-
smoking attitude prevails. As Rozin has pointed out, some marks of 
the moralization of smoking over time are the disgust it triggers in 
non-smokers, as well as the inclination to censure smokers and make 
broader judgment calls about their character.204 Geography and local 
culture matter too. In some places, such as areas in Europe, Asia, and 
the Middle East, smoking in public is still somewhat legitimate and 
 
 201. See, e.g., Paul Rozin, The Process of Moralization, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 218 (1999). 
 202. Id. 
 203. BRANDT & ROZIN, supra note 145, at 10. 
 204. See Rozin, Freedom, Choice and Public Well-Being, supra note 1, at 244; see also 
Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, 
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?pagewanted=all (“Smokers 
are ostracized; images of people smoking are censored; and entities touched by smoke are felt 
to be contaminated (so hotels have not only nonsmoking rooms but nonsmoking floors).”). 
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entails less guilt. Moreover, individualist cultures, such as America, 
tend to assume less responsibility for others and more privacy rights 
compared to collectivist societies, such as Korea. Public smoking, 
therefore, is reported to induce more guilt in Korea than in 
America.205 Biology matters as well, lending more taboo to smoking 
next to children or pregnant women than smoking next to resilient 
adults. Many other types of social cues also matter, especially when 
they are intentionally designed to appeal to individuals’ moral 
emotions and to sway their decisions; for example, signs aimed at 
reminding people of the damages caused by smokers and their 
second-hand smoke. Similarly, architectural designs of the public 
sphere, from buildings to airports, assign smokers designated and 
often stigmatized spaces, sending a clear message about the 
immorality of public smoking.206 
Finally, and most pertinent to the current discussion, law 
matters. As a powerful social mechanism, it has a recognizable 
impact on the process of moralization. With its unique ability to 
articulate norms, publish them, enforce them broadly, and, most 
importantly, change them over time, the law is a dynamic and 
forceful supplier of social cues that influence our emotions and 
behaviors. The impact of the legal regulation on public smoking is 
one known example. Legal bans on sexual harassment in the 
workplace and anti-discrimination laws operate similarly and 
participate in transforming a morally neutral behavior into an 
immoral one. Interestingly, the law also plays a significant role in the 
opposite process of amoralization: transforming behaviors that had 
been considered as immoral into morally neutral behaviors.207 As 
demonstrated by legal reforms concerning divorce, interracial 
marriage, same-sex marriage, and the use of marijuana, the law has 
the power to legitimize formerly morally controversial behaviors. 
Notably, in both moralization and amoralization processes, the 
updated legal norms are not only acts that reflect and formalize an 
earlier change of the social norms. Rather, they are influential tools 
 
 205.  Hyegyu Lee & Hye-Jin Paek, Roles of Guilt and Culture in Normative Influence: 
Testing Moderated Mediation in the Anti-Secondhand Smoking Context, 19 PSYCHOL., HEALTH 
& MED. 14 (2014). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Rozin, supra note 145, at 380. 
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that create and shape such modifications of the social norms. It is this 
expressive power of the law—and its consequences—that will occupy 
the coming Part. 
III. THE IMPACT OF LAW ON MORAL EMOTIONS 
The legal decision to enforce, or to refuse enforcement of a 
predatory contract, can serve as a powerful social cue to readers of 
the original decision. It can also have a powerful influence on the 
many other market actors who will be exposed to such legal 
messages in other ways, for example via legal counsel and the media. 
Unquestionably, a refusal to enforce a contract while declaring its 
unconscionability sends out a strong message of disapproval of both 
the behavior that led to the formation of such a contract and its 
unfair content. The power of the message comes from the expressive 
power of the law: its ability to make individuals internalize the values 
embodied in the legal message, or at least adjust their behavior in 
accordance with those values to avoid conflicts.208 Furthermore, 
when evaluating the ability of the law to offer influential social cues 
that shape emotions and behaviors, it is important to take into 
account more than the practical result of a case. The content is of 
utmost significance. In framing the question and context before 
them, and in articulating the reasoning for their final decision, 
judges can thus further enhance the message coming from their 
decision. Altogether, they can encourage or discourage self-
restrained behavior by market players who face an opportunity 
to exploit. 
Given the deeper understanding of the affective component of 
self-restraint, and of the more nuanced operation of guilt, how can 
legal decisions impact the affective dimension of human conscience-
based judgments? To cope with this broad question in a concrete 
and practical way, let me draw on two examples. The two cases 
discussed in detail below demonstrate how the manner of 
adjudicating disputes regarding predatory contracts may impact the 
 
 208.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2022 (1996); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 
607–08 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649 (2000). 
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emotions that are necessary for the operation of conscience in 
market situations. 
It is worth noting that I discuss and compare these two decisions 
not only, or even mainly, due to their opposing outcomes. Rather, 
the inquiry focuses on the process—namely the judicial discourse 
that led to the final decision. Careful analysis of the components of 
each of the decisions may offer important insights regarding the 
potential impact of each decision on the emotions and moral 
judgments of those exposed to it. Both examples are recent and 
therefore reflect judicial approaches to the unconscionability 
principle that are similarly possible at present time. I will start with a 
decision that has the potential to discourage future self-restraint and 
continue with one that has the opposite potential—to facilitate the 
operation of conscience in market actors. 
A. Suppressing Anticipated Guilt: Riggins (2013)209 
1. The contract and the litigation 
In December 2006, Robert Riggins contracted with 
Countrywide to borrow $642,000 to buy a property in Costa Mesa, 
California.210 According to the very short factual description in the 
case, Riggins’ loan application was completed via telephone based on 
a short conversation in which the lenders’ agent reviewed Riggins’ 
financial information and recommended a loan that would fit 
Riggins’ needs.211 In 2009, Riggins defaulted and, after a notice of 
default was filed, he filed a complaint seeking to avoid the 
enforcement of the loan agreement.212 One of Riggins’ main 
allegations against the validity of the loan agreement was that, during 
the application process, Countrywide’s agent falsely filled out the 
application form, listing—without Riggins’ knowledge—an inflated 
monthly income of $15,000.213 In reality, and known to the 
interviewer, Riggins “had little if any income at all.”214 Notably, the 
 
 209.  Riggins v. Bank of Am., No. SACV 12-0033 DOC (MLGx), 2013 WL 319285 
(C.D. Cal. 2013). 
 210.  Id. at *1. 
 211.  See id. 
 212.  Id. at *2. 
 213.  Id. at *1. 
 214.  Id. 
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decision did not include a denial of the alleged forgery of 
documents. Instead, the judge specifically mentioned that neither 
party presented the signed application forms.215 Despite the mutual 
reference, however, it seems that the lender, and not Mr. Riggins, 
had access to those forms, given the fact that the process was 
undeniably completed by phone, and it was the lender who both 
created the application form and filled it out on behalf of 
the borrower.216 
Moreover, the decision was written in 2013, when accumulating 
evidence regarding Countrywide’s mishandling of documents was 
widely available.217 In 2010, for example, Countrywide agreed to pay 
borrowers $108 million dollars to settle a complaint of the Federal 
Trade Commission regarding the predatory lending, including 
“loans made with little or no income or asset documentation.”218 
Eventually, it became clear from SEC allegations, which were neither 
admitted nor denied by Countrywide, that between 2005 and 
2007—the period relevant to Riggins’ 2006 loan—”Countrywide 
was writing riskier and risker loans.”219 Countrywide cared so little 
about the quality of loans of this kind because it had relied on selling 
them to the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, thereby harming not only the immediate victims but 
also “the financial system as a whole.”220 
In an effort to stop foreclosure proceedings, Riggins raised the 
argument of unconscionability. Dismissing this argument with 
prejudice, the judge relied on the formal two-prong test of 
 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  See id. 
 217.  See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street, CBS (Dec. 5, 2011), 
www.cbsnews.com/news/prosecuting-wall-street/ (interviewing Eileen Foster, a former senior 
executive at Countrywide Financial who reported that “Countrywide loan officers were 
forging and manipulating borrowers’ income and asset statements to help them get loans they 
weren’t qualified for and couldn’t afford”). 
 218.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for 
Overcharging Struggling Homeowners; Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans of 
Borrowers in Bankruptcy (June 7, 2010) (FTC File No. 0823205), www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2010/06/countrywide-will-pay-108-million-overcharging-struggling. 
 219.  U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 494, 
496–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 220.  Id. at 503. 
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unconscionability.221 He explained that Riggins did “not allege any 
facts that establish[ed] the procedural unconscionability element.”222 
2. Crowding out the moral emotions 
Recall the parents from the day-care centers study: once the 
researchers changed the framework from relational to rational and 
from care-based to market-like, self-restraint actually decreased and 
more parents allowed themselves to be late at the expense of the 
caregivers.223 Similar outcomes were demonstrated by the liquidated 
damages experiment,224 showing again that adopting a market 
framework tends to elicit less moral emotion, which in turn makes 
people care less about the interests of the other party.  
In Riggins, like in most contractual litigations, the context is 
commercial to begin with. However, the court enhanced the market 
effect and further distanced the moral emotions by its analysis of the 
nature of the relationship between the parties. Discussing the 
lending contract, the judge clarified that “lenders do not owe a 
fiduciary duty to borrowers.”225 With that, the court wiped the 
relationship between the parties clean of legitimate expectation of 
trust, loyalty, or honesty and denied any social ties between them. 
Indeed, after reading these words, one might wonder what exactly 
comprises the nature of the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers. The denial of the existence of fiduciary duty without 
defining any other prevailing duties, especially combined with the 
impersonal reference to “lenders” and “borrowers,” places the 
relationship at the core of the cold commercial market where people 
interact at arm’s length and do not have to be considerate of each 
other. In general, such judicial discourse, with its minimalist 
portrayal of the duties in the market sphere, has the ability to crowd 
out moral emotions. But for such framing, moral emotions would 
have been more easily evoked as a common response to an act of 
falsifying documents. 
 
 221.  Riggins, 2013 WL 319285, at *12–13 (explaining the two-prong test). 
 222.  Id. at *12. 
 223.  See supra Part II. 
 224.  See id. 
 225.  Riggins, 2013 WL 319285, at *10. 
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3. Hindering anticipated self-guilt 
As explained earlier, feelings of self-guilt arise from awareness 
that one has transgressed a social norm (actual guilt), or is about to 
do so (anticipated guilt).226 This valuable social mechanism depends 
on the clarity of the existing social norms. The clearer the norm, the 
easier it is for self-guilt to emerge or be anticipated. However, to the 
extent that a social norm against forging documents exists, the 
Riggins decision does much to obscure this norm. The most glaring 
feature of the decision is its willful neglect of the allegation that 
Countrywide’s representative listed a fake income on the application 
form he was filling out (and filing) on behalf of Mr. Riggins. The 
judge does not express even a doubt regarding such behavior, 
thereby creating an impression that such behavior is normal and 
socially acceptable. 
If this sound of silence is not loud enough, the court makes extra 
effort to clarify that whatever happened during the application 
process is meaningless in the eyes of the law. To that effect, a 
significant part of the analysis is aimed at drawing a bright dividing 
line between the forged loan application form and the actual loan 
agreement that followed it. In the court’s words: “[W]hile [Riggins] 
asserts that he did not know that Countrywide used an inflated 
income on his loan application, this was not a term of the 
agreement.”227 This distinction results in an enforcement of the loan 
agreement irrespective of the dubious behavior that facilitated its 
formation. Divorcing what may matter morally (falsified application) 
from what matters legally (only the agreement) works here to shift 
the focus away from Countrywide’s transgression. After all, it follows 
from the court’s analysis that even if the lender did behave 
inappropriately, this behavior relates to the application and not to the 
agreement and, thus, would not make any legal difference. The 
court even supports its analysis by referring to other cases in which 
lenders fabricated applications by inflating borrowers’ incomes.228 
Such reference both further normalizes this problematic behavior 
 
 226.  See supra Section II.D. 
 227.  Riggins, 2013 WL 319285, at *12 (emphasis added). 
 228.  See id. at *5; see, e.g., Perlas v. GMAC Mortg., LLC., 113 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
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and enhances the risk that more lenders will follow the herd due to 
the conformity bias. 
The fact that the court’s decision ignores the lender’s fraudulent 
behavior significantly decreases the visibility of social norms against 
faking documents and offering loans that are too risky to be repaid. 
Thus, it hinders the emergence of the type of guilt that may arise 
from the clash between such behavior and the pertaining social 
norms. If future business people are wondering whether to cross the 
lines of truth in order to increase their volume of transactions, or to 
exercise self-restraint, the Riggins decision certainly sends them the 
wrong message. 
Judicial decisions such as Riggins participate in the broader social 
process of amoralization; they work to disconnect a behavior that 
would otherwise be considered immoral from its moral qualities and 
transform it into a morally neutral activity.229 Amoralization of 
contractual manipulations occurs when the law—with all its 
authoritative and expressive powers—validates and enforces contracts 
that result from market misbehavior. It is even more so when judges 
explicitly celebrate amoralism, explaining that “[i]t is a strength 
rather than a weakness of contract law that it generally eschews a 
moral conception of transactions.”230 
In an amoral environment, when contracts are framed as merely 
a market game that is aimed at promoting self-interests, there is little 
to no social or moral expectation of self-restraint. Indeed, in some 
judges’ perspectives, greedy and unconstrained behavior is not only 
morally neutral but is also “the engine that propels a market 
economy.”231 Accordingly, when courts ignore, accept, or even 
appreciate acts of unrestrained selfishness, they increase the 
uncertainty regarding the social norms that govern the market. Such 
ambiguity, in turn, further inhibits the possible emergence of 
anticipated deontological guilt in those who consider driving “the 
hardest possible bargain.”232 
 
 229.  See Rozin, supra note 145, at 380. 
 230.  Classic Cheesecake Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 546 F.3d 839, 845–46 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 231.  Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 232.  Posner, supra note 12, at 1104. 
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4. Impeding anticipated other-guilt 
As seen earlier, there are two kinds of guilt.233 In addition to self-
guilt, deriving from transgression of social norms, guilty feelings may 
also emerge from realizing that one’s behavior has harmed others or 
has the potential to do so.234 To experience such actual or anticipated 
emotion, the harm caused by the misbehavior should be recognized 
and appreciated as having a significant negative impact on others. To 
facilitate this mechanism, it is necessary to feel a certain degree of 
empathy toward the harmed party. 
And yet, in Riggins the court blames the victim and makes it 
harder to feel empathy towards him. Specifically, the court more 
than hints that Riggins should have been more responsible, and even 
implies that he alone is at fault for his inability to pay the loan (after 
several years of payments). Indeed, in response to Riggins’ complaint 
regarding the falsification of his loan application, the court suggests 
that Riggins “is conflating [Countrywide’s] misrepresentation that 
he qualified for the loan based on ‘little to no income’ with the idea 
that [Countrywide] misrepresented that [Riggins] could afford the 
loan with ‘little to no income.’”235 This suggests that Riggins is both 
incapable of high-level thinking (conflating ideas) and unproductive 
(has no income without a justification). 
Further, following this unsympathetic description, the court 
declares the reliance of the borrower on the approval of his loan 
application by the lender as “unjustifiable.”236 Checking the 
borrower’s creditworthiness during the application process, the court 
explains, is a measure the lender takes for its own protection, and as 
such, it means nothing for the borrower. Hence, the court concludes 
that “borrowers rely on their own judgment and risk assessment in 
deciding whether to accept a loan.”237 In assigning the responsibility 
solely to the borrower, irrespective of the lender’s defective approval 
of the loan, the court effectively blames Riggins (the victim) for not 
giving up a loan after it has received the lender’s approval. 
 
 233.  See supra Section II.D.2. 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  Riggins v. Bank of Am., No. SACV 12-0033 DOC (MLGx), 2013 WL 319285 *5 
(C.D. Cal. 2013). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
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Significant to the operation of other-guilt, we know nothing 
about Riggins as a person or his ability to appropriately comprehend 
the meaning of Countrywide’s confirmation of his application. Even 
after reading the decision several times, one has no clue, for example, 
who Riggins is, how financially savvy he is, or even why he needed a 
loan. More generally, there is not even a single empathetic sentence 
in the case, and no reference is made to the obvious gap in 
bargaining power between the parties. Under such a thin 
description, the harm suffered by Riggins becomes invisible—a fact 
that further conceals the wrongfulness of Countrywide’s behavior 
and instead invites a harsh judgment of Riggins. Thus, it becomes 
more difficult for future similarly positioned parties to anticipate that 
using false information with the goal of misleading the other party 
may cause that party severe harm and yield guilty feelings. 
The judge in Riggins is not alone in exhibiting a lack of empathy 
toward the borrower and attributing the harm exclusively to his lack 
of caution. Research shows that many people have an inclination to 
evaluate cases of wrongdoing along those lines.238 Professor 
Wilkinson-Ryan has recently studied and explained the psychology of 
the inclination to blame the victim, instead of the wrongdoer, in the 
commercial setting.239 Her studies focus on the common situation in 
which a consumer signs a contract of adhesion without reading the 
fine print (the boilerplate). The studies expose a puzzle: on the one 
hand, subjects strongly believe that drafters should not impose unfair 
terms on consumers via the fine print that is almost never read, and 
on the other hand, they also believe that “the non-reading consumer 
consented to the contract and bears the blame for the resulting 
transactional harm.”240 How can such contradiction be explained? 
Wilkinson-Ryan offers several psychological accounts, and one that is 
particularly relevant to the judicial analysis in Riggins. 
 
 238.  See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities 
Influence the Relationship Between Americans, Business and Government, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 509, 540–41 (2010) (arguing that the tendency to blame the victim explains much 
of the popular rhetoric blaming underwater homeowners or borrowers in bankruptcy for their 
fates). For an example of the existing inclination to blame the victims in the context of sexual 
assaults such as rape and sexual harassment, see Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist 
Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663 (1998). 
 239.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1745 (2014) [hereinafter A Psychological Account]. 
 240.  Id. at 1765 (emphasis added). 
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Holding consumers, and not corporate-drafters, responsible for 
the harm caused by unfair terms, is a product of “motivated 
cognition” (or “motivated reasoning”)—a psychological 
phenomenon in which people’s preferred outcomes inadvertently 
drive their judgment.241 Since people seek to minimize their 
psychological discomfort, their inclination is to attribute the blame 
in a manner that would accomplish this goal.242 When harm occurs it 
threatens the preferable belief of most people: that the world is a just 
place and the system that controls their life is fair.243 While holding 
this belief people tend to blame the victims because it mitigates the 
threat, confirming how orderly the world is: people “get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get.”244 
Additionally, the belief that the victim’s behavior caused the 
harm that followed, offers people a sense that they can avoid similar 
harm. For example, in one study, Professor Wilkinson-Ryan showed 
that even with the knowledge that most people don’t read contracts 
and cannot fully understand the risks they entail, people still believe 
that they would have read and understood their own contracts and, 
by doing so, would have avoided harm.245 As Wilkinson-Ryan 
explains, manifesting the known “overconfidence bias,” people 
blame the victim while convincing themselves that under similar 
conditions they would have made better judgments (“it is your 
fault—and I am not like you”).246 Ultimately, attribution of blame to 
the victim helps people restore their faith that their environment 
is controllable. 
Returning to Riggins, cognitive psychology can explain why the 
judge was inclined to find Riggins responsible for not realizing he 
could not afford the loan that Countrywide approved. We have 
many reasons to assume that judges—as part of the justice system—
 
 241.  Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 
9 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 311 (2013). 
 242.  See id. 
 243.  See Yael Idisis et al., Attribution of Blame to Rape Victims Among Therapists and 
Non-Therapists, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & THE L. 103, 104 (2007). 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  A Psychological Account, supra note 239, at 1773–74. 
 246.  Id. at 1771. In one of her studies designed to examine this point, “subjects 
reported that they would spend more time, and read enough to ‘get the gist’ of a greater 
fraction of the contract, than the average consumer reading the same contract.” Id. at 1773. 
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are subject to motivated cognition, believe in a just world, and 
accordingly prefer to view and portray the contractual game as 
occurring in a “fair and orderly marketplace.”247 Similarly, judges—
with their high education, years of experience, and superior status—
are surely sharing the overconfidence bias that allows them to blame 
victims, like Riggins, while believing that they would have never 
fallen into such a trap. 
5. Summary 
The Riggins decision is by no means an exceptional one, but 
rather a common representation of many other disputes around 
contracts that were drafted and formed while transgressing basic 
norms of behavior. The decision itself cites similar past decisions and 
was followed by other courts shortly after its publication.248 Shifting 
the focus onto emotions allows us, however, to notice something 
new about this line of cases. It helps us understand how decisions of 
this sort may unintentionally have a long-term negative impact on 
people’s ability to exercise self-restraint. In a market setting, when 
the existence of moral and social norms is unacknowledged, and 
when the resulting harm to others remains unrecognized, the 
emergence of anticipated guilt—the main motivator of conscience-
based self-restraint—simply becomes less probable. 
B. Evoking Anticipated Guilt: Stoll (2010)249 
1. The contract and the litigation 
The decision in Stoll offers a counter example to Riggins. In this 
judicial review of unrestrained market behavior, the court enables, 
rather than impedes, the possible emergence of anticipated guilt, 
thereby encouraging the operation of conscience.  
The disputed contract was a land purchase contract relating to 
sixty acres of farmland in Oklahoma.250 A few years after the sale was 
completed, the seller, Ronald Stoll, sued the buyers, Xiong and 
 
 247.  See id. at 1768. For studies showing that judges are probably subject to similar 
biases as all other people, see review of literature in Sood, supra note 241, at 318–19. 
 248.  See e.g., Graham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 249.  Stoll v. Chong Lor Xiong, 241 P.3d 301 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). 
 250.  Id. at 302–03. 
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Yang, who were husband and wife.251 Stoll argued that they had 
breached a term in the contact and requested the term’s 
enforcement.252 The contract, drafted by Stoll, included a term 
which entitled Stoll not only to the price of the land (some 
$130,000) but also to a free thirty-year supply of chicken litter 
accumulated in the farm.253 The worth of such free supply was later 
conservatively estimated by the court, based on Stoll’s minimized 
valuation of the price per ton of chicken litter, to be $216,000254—
166 percent above the consideration under the contract. 
When Stoll learned that Xiong and Yang sold chicken litter to 
another person, he sued and demanded the enforcement of the free-
supply term.255 Xiong and Yang defended themselves, arguing that 
the term was inserted into the contract without their knowledge or 
understanding and that enforcing it would mean that they would 
end up paying the seller (in litter) much more than the worth of the 
land itself.256 The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, 
accepting those factual arguments and deciding that the free-supply 
term was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.257 
2. Inviting moral emotions 
The decision in Stoll allows and even invites affective response in 
general and triggers the moral emotions in particular. Although, like 
Riggins and many other contractual disputes, the case is set in the 
commercial sphere, human beings take center stage in the 
presentation of facts. The very first thing the decision’s readers learn 
is that the buyers are a married couple and are both immigrants from 
Laos. Additional personal facts about the couple’s limited education 
and lingual difficulties follow and will be discussed separately below 
in the context of the ability to anticipate other-guilt. For now, 
however, the point is more general: the narrative in Stoll is emotions-
 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. at 303. 
 253.  Id. at 303–04. 
 254.  Id. at 305. 
 255.  Id. at 303. 
 256.  See id. at 304–06. 
 257.  Id. at 304, 306. 
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friendly because it reveals, rather than conceals, the humanity of the 
parties to the questionable contract. 
Next, there is a true invitation to feel moral emotions as the 
court highlights the moral dimension of the dispute in several ways. 
First, it does so by making significant rhetorical choices. In a short 
decision (about half the length of Riggins), the court uses the 
forceful expression “shock the conscience” three times, while the 
idea of fairness (fair behavior or fair terms) is mentioned six times.258 
As a result, readers are placed at the core of a moral dilemma and not 
only at the heart of the market. 
Second, in applying the unconscionability doctrine, the court 
avoids technical language and instead emphasizes the doctrine’s 
ethical core. Associating the doctrine with other prime examples of 
moral transgressions, the court’s words remind readers that 
“[u]nconscionability is directly related to fraud and deceit.”259 
Third, to more precisely define unconscionability, the court 
chooses the traditional English definition with its emphasis on 
human morality, rather than Professor Leff ’s modern version with its 
formal structure—two neatly defined prongs of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.260 Albeit without mentioning the 
historical Earl of Chesterfield case,261 the court cites the morality-
oriented explanation according to which “[a]n unconscionable 
contract is one which no person in his senses, not under delusion 
would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man 
would accept on the other.”262 Defining an unconscionable contract 
in that way has the power to bring readers to examine contractual 
behavior with morality in mind, against the yardstick of how a “fair 
and honest man” would have behaved. This in turn facilitates the 
anticipation of moral emotions. 
3. Facilitating anticipated self-guilt 
Again, to anticipate self-guilt, social norms have to be well 
defined and consistently regarded by people and institutions with 
 
 258.  Id. at 304–06. 
 259.  Id. at 305 (citing Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976)). 
 260.  See supra note 24 (explaining Leff’s two-prong analysis). 
 261.  See supra Part I. 
 262.  Stoll, 241 P.3d at 305 (citing Barnes, 548 P.2d at 1020). 
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social authority.263 The decision in Stoll demonstrates how courts can 
offer such support of the social norms. It both crystalizes and 
clarifies the wrongfulness of Stoll’s behavior. The court explains that 
to insert a predatory term into a contract without the full awareness 
of the other party is against acceptable social norms.264 It further 
elucidates more generally that the same social norms forbid the 
stronger party to include clauses that “are so one-sided as to oppress 
or unfairly surprise one of the parties.”265 
Moreover, the same norms against inserting unfair terms into a 
contract specifically include “contractual terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”266 Accordingly, after 
reading the court’s analysis, one is left with no remaining doubt that, 
even in a purely commercial setting and highly capitalist society, a 
seller cannot impose “additional payment to him over and above the 
stated price.”267 There is also no question that it is wrong to take 
advantage of the fact that the other party was not savvy enough to 
grasp the financial mechanism that creates such a hidden increase of 
the consideration. Here, as the court lucidly determines, “the land 
sale contract is onerous to one side of the contracting parties while 
solely benefitting the other, and the parties to be surcharged with 
the extra expense were, due to language and education, unable to 
understand the nature of the contract.”268 
Importantly, the court highlights rather than denies the ties 
between law, social norms, and the morality of the market. To that 
effect, the power evoked by judicial clarification of the prevalent 
social norms is enhanced through this explicit reminder of the 
court’s authority to enforce social norms. Accordingly, the court 
explains that the question of whether a contract (or one of its terms) 
is unfair “is one of law for the Court to decide,”269 but at the same 
time, the law itself (here the doctrine of unconscionability) is based 
 
 263.  See supra Section II.D.2. 
 264.  Stoll, 241 P.3d at 305. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. at 305–06. 
 268.  Id. at 306. 
 269.  Id. at 305 (citing Phillips Machinery Co. v. LeBlond, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318, 322 
(N.D. Okla. 1980)). 
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on “a generally accepted social attitude of fairness.”270 In other 
words, the court in Stoll defines and enforces with much authority 
the red lines governing market players’ behavior, thus facilitating the 
anticipation of guilt if those lines are crossed. 
Finally, in condemning Stoll’s behavior, the court utilizes 
another moral emotion to support the operation of self-guilt: 
disgust.271 On appeal, the court repeats an expression of disgust used 
by the trial court, confirming the validity and importance of such a 
passionate judicial response. In the trial court’s words: 
I’ve read this and reread this and reread this. And I have tried to 
think of an example that I think was more unconscionable than the 
situation [that] I find to have been here as far as that clause. And to 
be real honest with you, I can’t think of one. And if 
unconscionability has any meaning in the law at all, if that is a 
viable theory at all, then I think this is a prime example of it.272 
Such verbal expression of disgust,273 especially when expressed by 
people who are in a position of power, is one of society’s ways of 
marking a behavior as immoral; it is an integral part of Rozin’s 
model of moralization. What theorists call “moral disgust”274 
functions here to add affective dimension to the protection of social 
norms. The idea was explained by one theorist via the following 
formula: “Normative prohibitions against action X will be more 
likely to survive if action X elicits (or is easily led to elicit) negative 
affect.”275 Applying the formula, the negative emotion of disgust, as 
expressed by the trial judge and endorsed by the appellate court, 
 
 270.  Id. at 305 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981)). 
 271.  See WILLIAM MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 179–205 (1997) (discussing the 
moral power of disgust). 
 272.  Stoll, 241 P.3d at 304 (citing the trial court). 
 273.  See Joshua Tybur & Debra Lieberman, Animal Reminders, Pathogens, and Sex: 
Evaluating Distinct Evolutionary Theories of Disgust, EMOTION RESEARCHER (March 2014), 
http://emotionresearcher.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Understanding-Disgust-
Issue-March-2014-Unformatted-PDFs.pdf (discussing the fact that disgust may be expressed 
verbally “to communicate moral condemnation”). 
 274.  See, e.g., Hana A. Chapman, & Adam K. Anderson, Things Rank and Gross in 
Nature: A Review and Synthesis of Moral Disgust, 139 PSYCHOL. BULL. 300 (2013); 
Jason A. Clark & Daniel M. T. Fessler, The Role of Disgust in Norms, and of Norms in Disgust 
Research: Why Liberals Shouldn’t be Morally Disgusted by Moral Disgust, 34 TOPOI 483 (2014). 
 275.  SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL RULES 129 (2004). 
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works to signify the immorality of Stoll’s behavior. It thus 
emphasizes and supports the existence of a social norm against such 
behavior. In that sense, disgust’s social and moral role is to support 
important values.276 
By pointing out the tone used by the trial judge and echoed by 
the court of appeals, I don’t mean to suggest that such expression of 
disgust was purposefully chosen in order to fortify a norm against 
Stoll’s exploitation of his buyers. I do believe, however, that the 
strong language reflects affective response of the involved judges, 
and as such, has greater potential to elicit moral emotions in others. 
Indeed, in responding with disgust to acts of greed that come at the 
expense of others, judges are not alone. Experiments using new 
technologies of brain imaging have shown brain activity in areas 
associated with disgust (the insula) in response to a significantly 
unfair division of money between participants in a bargaining 
game.277 And so, with or without awareness, the judges in Stoll 
expressed their own condemnation of Stoll’s behavior in a manner 
that supports the view that such behavior is immoral and should 
be avoided. 
4. Enabling anticipated other-guilt 
In contrast to Riggins, the Stoll court emphasizes the harm 
caused by Stoll and assigns the blame solely to the wrongdoer while 
raising empathy for his victims. First, as to the harm, the court 
calculates in detail the severe economic damage that the free-supply 
term was designed to cause. The court takes the time to do the math 
and set concrete numbers on the range of harm—a loss of hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, with the exact amount (between $216,000 
and $450,000) depending on the value per ton of chicken litter. 
Then, beyond prices, the court also makes an effort to illustrate and 
communicate the severity of the harm. It does so by comparing the 
 
 276.  See Jason A. Clark & Philip A. Powell, Defending Disgust: Why Disgust Is Morally 
Beneficial, EMOTION RESEARCHER (Mar. 2014), http://emotionresearcher.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Understanding-Disgust-Issue-March-2014-Unformatted-
PDFs.pdf; see also Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1602, 1603–04 
(2002) (discussing the debate regarding the role of disgust in criminal law). 
 277.  See Nichols, supra note 34.  
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value of the free litter supply term to the value of the purchase 
transaction, thereby exposing how unreasonable Stoll’s term was. 
Second, the court explicitly and exclusively assigns blame to 
Stoll. Readers are reminded twice that “it was [Stoll’s] idea to 
include the chicken litter paragraph in the land purchase 
contract.”278 Moreover, the court even includes a hint regarding 
Stoll’s possible economic motive, explaining that just before the 
formation of the contract “rising oil prices drove up the cost of 
commercial fertilizer”279—a fact that would make a free supply of 
chicken litter especially attractive. 
At the same time, the court makes sure to clarify that the buyers 
were not blameworthy. Despite Stoll’s express argument that the 
buyers had a duty to read and understand the term he added (note 
the similarity to Riggins), the court concludes that the victims did 
not have the ability to do so. Referring again to the buyers’ personal 
information that had opened the decision (discussed below), the 
court rejects these arguments, stating: “the parties to be surcharged 
with the extra expense were, due to language and education, unable 
to understand the nature of the contract.”280 It is worth noting that 
the studies on the inclination to blame the victim support the court’s 
analysis because they demonstrate that people’s general inclination to 
blame the victims for failure to read their contracts declines when 
they are reminded that reading contracts does not necessarily mean 
understanding them due to overwhelming levels of 
complex information.281 
Finally, the court’s description of the facts opens with a detailed 
portrayal of the buyers that highlights their humanity and facilitates 
feelings of empathy. As mentioned before, at the very start readers 
learn that Xiong and Yang are husband and wife and originally from 
Laos.282 To explain much of what happened next, the court also 
describes their limited English and minimal education. However, the 
 
 278.  Stoll v. Chong Lor Xiong, 241 P.3d 301, 305 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). Just a few 
paragraphs later the court mentions this again. See id. at 306 (“Under Stoll’s interpretation of 
paragraph 10 (which was his “idea”), the land sale contract is onerous to one side of the 
contracting parties.”). 
 279.  Id. at 305. 
 280.  Id. at 306. 
 281.  See A Psychological Account, supra note 239, at 1779–81. 
 282.  Stoll, 241 P.3d at 302. 
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court does not leave it at that, but rather avoids describing Xiong 
and Yang as victims. By adding some background details that at first 
glance may seem irrelevant to the dispute, the court facilitates 
understanding of the couple’s bounded capabilities while fostering 
appreciation for their agency, resilience, determination, and progress 
in life. For example, readers learn that Xiong “became a refugee due 
to the Vietnam War” and then spent three years of his life in a 
refugee camp in Thailand.283 Yang, too, arrived in the U.S. as a 
young adult after receiving no education in Laos. And yet, despite 
this challenging beginning, they both attended adult school in the 
U.S., and, as this case shows, became owners of farmland in 
Oklahoma and productive growers of poultry. 
Having learned all this information about Xiong and Yang, it 
becomes easier to understand how easy (but wrong) it was for Stoll 
to have them sign a purchase contract in which the actual price was, 
in fact, much higher than the one clearly stated as the land’s price 
under the contract. As a result of the judiciary’s empathetic 
presentation, it is much harder to blame Xiong and Yang for what 
happened to them. It is also clearer—and more predictable—that 
behaving as Stoll did against people like Xiong and Yang, may yield 
guilty feelings—guilt for harming others without any justification. 
5. Summary 
In Stoll, the court utilized the doctrine of unconscionability in a 
manner that can assist others in anticipating the two different kinds 
of guilt that may stem from exploitative behavior. At every relevant 
point, the Stoll court did the opposite of the court in Riggins: it 
emphasized the issue of conscience, explained exactly what was 
wrong with Stoll’s behavior, and highlighted the harm that was 
caused by such behavior. And, although there are currently many 
more courts that tend to use a Riggins-like, amoral approach, at least 
the editors of one important treatise have found Stoll’s moral 
approach to be an instructive example of courts’ use of the 
unconscionability doctrine.284 
 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  See 12 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 64.3, LEXIS 
(database updated 2015) (“Unconscionability has both a procedural (means of arriving at a 
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IV. FOSTERING SELF-RESTRAINT 
Drawing on the Riggins and Stoll examples, what can courts do 
more generally to foster self-restraint in the market and 
discourage exploitation? 
A. Applying Stout’s Model 
From Stout we have already gained two recommendations 
regarding the behavioral cultivation of conscience. Applying them to 
the unconscionability context will thus be an apt starting point. The 
first lies in the power that authority has in encouraging people to 
behave prosocially. Applied to the contractual context, the courts—as 
powerful and respected sources of authority in our society—should 
explicitly insist that greedy market players restrain their behavior and 
refrain from taking advantage of others’ vulnerability. As Stout 
predicts, and as many studies make clear, most people would simply 
obey such a clear message. Indeed, contract law has an important 
role in educating market actors. It “serves a type of expressive 
function by communicating to tradesmen that certain standards of 
decency will be required of their conduct.”285 In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that while the court in Riggins remained silent 
regarding the lenders’ behavior, the court in Stoll did exactly what 
Stout recommends by expressing a strong demand for fairness and a 
direct condemnation of exploitation. 
The second of Stout’s recommendations relates to the 
conformity bias: people will do what they believe most others are 
doing. Applied to contract law, courts should evoke their power to 
cultivate self-restraint by emphasizing the atypicality of market 
exploitation, and the prosocial behavior of most reasonable members 
of society. In Stoll, for example, the court reflects such a view by 
responding intensely to the seller’s behavior, expressing a sense of 
shock and disgust that underscores the abnormality of the behavior. 
In contrast, treating transgressions as normal and common in the 
market—as the Riggins court does when dealing with forged 
 
contract) and a substantive (oppression, harshness) aspect. To illustrate both these aspects take 
the case [of] Stoll v. Chong Lor Xiong.”) 
 285.  Erin Ann O’Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 
143, at 186. 
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documents—has the opposite effect. It creates the dangerous 
impression that the herd behaves deceitfully and selfishly, thereby 
inviting others to follow. Such a message can hinder, rather than 
foster, self-restraint due to the strength of the conformity bias and 
the contagious nature of immoral behavior.286 
B. Proposal: Fostering Self-Restraint via the Emotions 
And yet, applying Stout’s recommendations is not enough. As I 
have argued in Part II, emotions play a critical role in shaping 
people’s moral judgments and behaviors. Given the connection 
between moral emotions and moral judgments, the question then 
becomes: what can be learned from reading Riggins and Stoll about 
the ability of judicial decisions to impact self-restraint via their 
influence over relevant affective processes? This question is not 
discussed by Stout. 
To begin with, it seems that this question should be 
distinguished from the traditional debate, which asks whether courts 
should intervene in contractual relationships or not. Taking affective 
consequences into account calls for a focus on how courts should 
discuss inappropriate market acts that are exposed during the 
litigation, regardless of the outcome of the case.  
For the operation of the moral emotions, the content of the 
analysis may matter more than its final enforcement decision. On one 
hand, even a decision to invalidate a contract due to its 
unconscionability can evoke very minimal affective response and thus 
offer very limited encouragement of future self-restraint. On the 
other hand, decisions that eventually enforce the contract (or part of 
it) can still enable others to experience moral emotions and 
particularly to anticipate the two kinds of guilt that may yield self-
restraint. For purposes of facilitating self-restraint and supporting the 
ethics of the market, I suggest that the framing, reasoning, and 
rhetoric of judicial decisions can have significant impact. In contrast, 
a hyper-rational discourse that avoids moral questions is likely to 
result in the unintended cost of impairing the operation of emotions, 
thereby fostering greedy and exploitative behavior. Therefore, judges 
can play an important positive social role by being mindful of the 
 
 286.  See supra Part II and especially the dishonesty experiment. 
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moral component of the dispute and by utilizing unconscionability 
in a manner that would support, rather than hinder, the workings of 
the emotions that bring about self-restraint. Toward achieving this 
broad goal, I draw the proposal into three concrete steps, each 
grounded in years of studies of human behavior and 
human emotions. 
The first step is to welcome, rather than ostracize, the moral 
emotions. It is important that judges clarify that social norms and 
questions of morality do not stop at the gates of the market. Neither 
are they foreign concepts before the law. Both the interaction of 
parties in the market and the formation of contracts are human 
behaviors, framed by interpersonal relationships. As such, they are 
intertwined with ethical questions and replete with emotions. 
Decisions that have the ability to encourage future self-restraint start, 
as demonstrated in Stoll, from a discourse that reflects the human 
and moral aspects of the dispute, creating an environment within 
which ethical concerns and moral emotions are both natural 
and welcome. 
The second step is to clarify rather than cloud pertinent social 
norms. This step is necessary to support the workings of one type of 
guilt: self-guilt. Judges are capable of highlighting a norm that has 
been transgressed by articulating it with the judiciary’s unique power 
and authority. Significantly, the process of defining transgressions 
and condemning them can be effective even if eventually—due to 
narrower legal reasons (such as burdens of proof)—the contract that 
resulted from the disreputable behavior has to be enforced. In 
contrast, ignoring wrongful behaviors makes the relevant social 
norms hazy and interrupts the emergence of anticipated self-guilt by 
blurring the lines between intolerable and acceptable behaviors. 
The third step is to portray the damage that results from the 
misbehavior and to do this with empathy to the harmed party. To 
achieve this, judges must resist the human inclination to blame the 
victims for their sufferings, an effort similar to judicial efforts in the 
contexts of rape and sexual harassment. An empathetic emphasis on 
the fact that one party’s behavior had dire influence on other 
members of society can facilitate the operation of the second type of 
guilt: other-guilt. It is important to note that judicial treatment of 
the exploited party with empathy is the appropriate approach for 
another reason. Courts are part of a broad, state-based system that 
impacts distributive justice in multiple ways. This system is 
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responsible for at least some of the vulnerabilities of weaker parties, 
leaving them with inferior bargaining power and subject to 
exploitation. As such, courts ought to put exploitation in its social 
context rather than framing it merely as a matter of flawed individual 
choice of the exploited party. In other words, judges may have more 
than an ability to portray the exploited party with empathy: they may 
have a duty to do so.287 
Before concluding my proposal, it is worth recognizing and 
explaining the special importance of the last step, namely the salient 
role of highlighting the harm to others caused by the exploiters. 
Much of the heated debate regarding the use of unconscionability 
originates from the power assigned to individualism and private 
autonomy in our culture. Judicial use of unconscionability is often 
criticized for entailing an undesired intervention in the freedom of 
contract—one of the leading symbols of neoliberal western societies. 
In this regime, establishing harm to others is the most effective way, 
if not the only way, to justify intervention and limitation of freedom. 
Indeed, as morality theorists have noted, “Our moral system . . . 
focuses on harm to others.”288 The third step in my proposal is, 
therefore, critical not only to the ability to anticipate other-guilt, but 
also more generally to justify judicial decisions that utilize the 
unconscionability principle to invalidate predatory contracts. 
C. A Comment about the Role of the Judiciary 
Some may criticize my proposal for its reliance on a doctrine that 
is implemented by courts and is distanced from the legislator’s 
control.289 One may argue that predatory contracts should be 
regulated in a more democratic and predictable way via state or 
federal legislation. I would like to briefly address this concern by 
revisiting the problematic issue of payday loans that opened 
this Article.  
 
 287.  Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 313 (2015). 
 288.  Rozin, Freedom, Choice and Public Well-Being, supra note 1, at 241. 
 289.  Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common 
Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 353 (1969) (opposing the promotion of fairness “via 
the judicial bureaucracy, on an ad hoc case-by-case basis essentially unrestrained by legislative or 
administrative guidance”). 
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The rich and those with reasonably paying jobs do not need 
payday loans; only those who are economically vulnerable use them. 
As a result, the gap in bargaining power between the lenders and the 
borrowers in those transactions is immense and, and as demonstrated 
by the case of Ms. Charley, opens boundless opportunities for 
predatory interest rates and other oppressive terms. Regulators at all 
levels have tried to control the resulting exploitation in a variety of 
ways. However, as ingeniously illustrated by John Oliver,290 
regulations always suffer from loopholes which greedy market players 
are quick to identify and use in order to continue profiting from 
others’ vulnerability. For example, lenders have started to lend via 
the Internet to escape state-based regulations.291 More than that, at 
times lenders take intentional technical steps that put them out of 
the reach of a particular regulation altogether, and then feel that they 
have done no wrong just because the specific regulation does not 
apply to them.292 Such was the case with the lender that exploited 
Ms. Charley: having realized that payday loans are becoming 
increasingly policed, the lender converted its loans to a similar 
product with another name and argued that under this new name 
the egregious interest was legitimate. This difficulty of any rule-
based regulative method was captured by Professor Henry Smith 
who wrote “[p]lugging nine out of ten loopholes is useless if all the 
evaders can rush through the tenth.”293 Furthermore, in such cases, 
the ability to escape the regulatory limitations merely offers an 
 
 290.  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, YOUTUBE (HBO television broadcast Aug. 10, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDylgzybWAw. 
 291.  Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucía Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How 
States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 31, 38 (2011). For another example see William M. Woodyard & Chad G. Marzen, 
Is Greed Good? A Catholic Perspective on Modern Usury, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 185, 216 
(describing a “Texas loophole that allows title-loan lenders to be classified as a ‘credit service 
organization’ rather than as a lender” and explaining that this “loophole allows Texas title-loan 
‘credit service organizations’ to charge triple-digit interest rates”). 
 292.  For example, when Ohio banned interest above 28% charged by short term lenders, 
the lawyer of one pay day loan company explained to a judge that the ban does not apply to his 
client, Cashland, because it never registered as a short term lender. See Last Week Tonight with 
John Oliver, supra note 290. Apparently no other company in Ohio has registered as a short 
term lender. Id. Instead, the same lenders registered themselves as mortgage lenders and have 
thus seen themselves free of the limitation of interest. Id. 
 293.  Henry E. Smith, Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 233 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014). 
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artificial way to clear the conscience, or at least escape its judgment. 
Indeed, at least one state has explained the special value of the 
judicial unconscionability doctrine as a blanket rule: “The legislative 
process is too slow to keep up with market practices, so the courts 
must have power to monitor the market for the protection of 
all participants.”294 
More generally, although the law cannot totally stop people from 
trying to profit from taking advantage of others, it can make it 
harder for them to succeed while encouraging them to refrain from 
further attempts. As proposed here, this goal can be best achieved by 
crystalizing a legal norm against exploitation. Ideally, legislators can 
announce such a norm—as done by other Western legal systems.295 
Until such reform occurs in a Common Law legal system, however, 
utilizing the concept of unconscionability can send a clear and 
general message that any form of exploitation is wrong and 
forbidden, regardless of the concrete method used. Indeed, in Ms. 
Charley’s case the courts have used a legislated version of the 
unconscionability doctrine to do just that, explaining that such 
legislation is “leaving it for courts to determine when the market is 
not free, and empowering courts to stop and preclude those who 
 
 294.  JOHN L. COSTELLO, VIRGINIA REMEDIES § 10.11, LEXIS (database updated 
2015); see also David Ray Papke, Perpetuating Poverty: Exploitative Businesses, the Urban Poor, 
and the Failure to Reform, 16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 223, 225 
(2014) (“The business models and concomitant contractual agreements of rent-to-own 
outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns are so sophisticated and adjustable as to make them 
virtually impervious to regulation. As a result, rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title 
pawns continue not only to exploit the urban poor, but also to socioeconomically subjugate 
the urban poor by trapping them into a ceaseless debt cycle. A blanket proscription of these 
tawdry businesses might be the only way to drive them from our midst and to eliminate their 
active role in the perpetuation of urban poverty.”) (emphasis added). 
 295.  For example, Article 51 of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law focuses on “unfair exploitation.” The article reads as follows: 
“A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: (a) 
that party was dependent on, or had a relationship of trust with, the other party, was 
in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, or 
inexperienced; and (b) the other party knew or could be expected to have known 
this and, in the light of the circumstances and purpose of the contract, exploited the 
first party’s situation by taking an excessive benefit or unfair advantage.” 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 52 (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0635. 
02.KEREN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:19 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
498 
prey on the desperation of others. . . .”296 This 2014 decision fits the 
understanding that three decades earlier, in the most famous 
unconscionability decision (Williams): “[j]udges and legislators did 
not advance competing regulatory visions.”297 Phrased differently, 
courts and legislators are part of the same system and can work in 
tandem to discourage oppressive market behavior. 
And last, once presented with a dispute, courts have no choice 
but to rule, a fact that makes their impact on market norms 
unavoidable, whether they enforce or refuse to enforce predatory 
contracts. Given the immorality of exploitation, courts should 
attempt to mitigate injustice rather than to participate in its 
perpetuation. And, in doing so, on a case-by-case basis, courts have a 
special impact that no legislature is able to achieve. The human 
narratives that occupy judicial decisions have a unique ability to 
spread an anti-exploitation message by effectively evoking in readers’ 
moral emotions. 
CONCLUSION 
For many years, scholars have argued both for and against using 
the unconscionability doctrine. They have done so, however, without 
taking the emotions that impact people’s behavior into account. This 
Article has sought to change that by focusing on the affective 
consequences of decisions that either use or refrain from using 
unconscionability to respond to wrongful contractual behavior and 
cope with predatory contracts. 
Modern courts’ reluctance to invalidate contracts for 
unconscionability impedes affective mechanisms that enable self-
restraint. Many judicial decisions, most significantly those written in 
the last decades of the post-Williams neoliberal era, demonstrate how 
law might impair the workings of conscience and limit the human 
ability to resist the temptation to take advantage of others. Law may 
unintentionally discourage self-restraint by creating an environment 
that is unwelcoming to moral self-reflection, by treating transgressions 
as if they were normal, and especially by blaming the victims of 
exploitation rather than their exploiters. In a legal environment that is 
 
 296.  State ex rel. King v. B&B Inv. Grp., 329 P.3d 658, 671 (N.M. 2014). 
 297.  Fleming, supra note 35, at 1388. 
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amoral and in which the unconscionability principle is underused, 
people are more likely to act out of greed at the expense of others. 
Normatively, it is necessary to change such unintended 
consequences. It is time to recognize the price society pays for legally 
ignoring exploitation and other immoral market behaviors. It is time 
to revive the idea of “courts of conscience” while filling it up with new 
content based on contemporary scientific knowledge. Outside of law, 
new studies and advanced technologies have improved our 
understanding of the operation of the moral emotions and their 
importance in shaping social behavior. Particularly, as discussed in this 
Article, the ability to anticipate feelings of guilt is key to the operation 
of conscience and to the execution of self-restraint. Given courts’ 
unique social power, such new knowledge ought to be utilized in the 
legal realm. Instead of avoiding questions of conscience, as proposed 
by some critics of the unconscionability principle, courts can utilize 
this principle and their expressive power to influence society in a 
positive manner. They can foster self-restraint by emphasizing the 
question of conscience and enabling people to better anticipate the 
guilt they may feel from breaking social norms and hurting others. 
Ultimately, judicial work that denounces exploitation of vulnerability 
can not only facilitate more self-restraint, it can also strengthen the 
social norms against such behavior. 
To be sure, even in periods dominated by the logic of the 
market, some courts, such as in Stoll, have wielded unconscionability 
with conscience in mind. This approach has the potential to enable 
rather than impair the operation of the moral emotions and it thus 
can promote self-restraint. This Article’s analysis and particularly its 
final proposal offer historical, scientific, and theoretical support for 
the work of those fewer courts. To counter the calls for judicial 
amoralism, this Article has offered a reasoned justification for 
strengthening the place of those courts that have never stopped 
functioning as “courts of conscience.” 
Given the constant growth of economic inequalities, and the 
abundance of exploitative behaviors in the market, the task of 
utilizing the unconscionability principle to encourage self-restraint 
seems more urgent than ever. Significantly, even those concerned 
with judicial interventions in market activities may see value in the 
long-term potential of this Article’s thesis: the more market players 
will learn to act with self-restraint, the less courts will need to 
intervene and impose norms of fairness. 
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